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WhenthePeopleSpeak
WhenthePeopleSpeak
DeliberativeDemocracyand
PublicConsultation
JamesS.Fishkin
Thisbookisdedicatedtothememoryofmyparents,
JosephandFannieFishkin,whomadeitallpossible
Charts
1.DemocraticAspirations
FromAthenstoAthens
Consultingthepublic
The“lterandthemirror
Re”ectingthepeopleastheyare
Deliberativeversusmassdemocracy:Anearlyskirmish
4.MakingDeliberativeDemocracyPractical
Bringingthepublicspheretolife:Fourquestions
Howinclusive?
Howthoughtful?
Avoidingdistortions:Theproblemofdomination
Avoidingdistortions:Polarizationandgroupthink
Towhateffect?
Underwhatconditions?
5.MakingDeliberationConsequential
AcasefromChina
Assessingthepollwithahumanface:Thoughtfulness
Movementtoextremes?
Towhateffect?
Changesinpolicyattitudes
Changesinvotingintention
Changesinciviccapacities
Changesincollectiveconsistency
Changesinthepublicdialogue
Changesinpolicy
6.DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
Pushingtheboundariesofpublicconsultation
Thisisashortbookwithalonghistory.Itistheresultofmany
deliberations„normative,empirical,andpractical.
OnthenormativesideIwanttothanksomekeyteachersandcol-
leagues.RobertDahl“rstinspiredmetothinkaboutdemocratictheory.
BruceAckermanandIhavehadadialoguenowoverthreedecades,a
dialoguewhichledtoourbook
DeliberationDay
areevidentthroughoutthiswork,notjustwhereIrefertoourempirical
work,butalsoonthenormativetheoryside.
Inaddition,IwouldliketothankNormanBradburnandRogerJowell
fortheircrucialcollaborationsontheearlyBritishandAmericanDPs.
Theyarebothinspiringresearcherstoworkwith.Iwouldalsoliketo
thankDonGreen,CynthiaFarrar,ChristianList,KasperMoellerHanson,
PamRyan,TessaTan-Torres,VirojTangcharoensathien,VijjKasemsup,
forprovidingmewiththeoccasion,notjustbecauseofhisexcellentbook
butbecauseoftheproblemitposed.
WhenIthoughtoftheidea,IimmediatelyconsultedtwoFellowsI
especiallytrustedforadvice,BobandNanKeohane.Theyraisedenough
interestingandtoughquestionsthatIcontinuedtopursueit.Soonafter
that,Ipublisheditinthe
(August1988).Butitonlybecamepracti-
TheNationalIssuesConvention,andthenthemanyDPsintheUnited
Statesthatfollowed,wouldnothavehappenedwereitnotfortwo
extraordinarypersons:DanWerner,ExecutiveProducer,MacNeil/Lehrer
Productions,andCharlsE.Walker,whotaughtme,morethananyone
else,howanideacouldbeturnedintoreality.Ialsowanttothank
DavidLloyd,CommissioningEditor,ChannelFour,whomadetheBritish
projectshappenandwhosupervisedthemwithcareandvision.Andreas
WhittamSmith,FounderandEditorof
TheIndependent
,wasalsoakey
partnerinmakingthe“rstDPhappen.The“veBritishDPsonChannel
FourwerealsosuccessfulbecauseofsuperbtalentatGranadaTelevision
suchasSheenaMacDonald,CharlesTremayne,DorothyByrne,andthe
lateSarahMainwaring-White.
ThevariousenergyŽDPswerebasedonaninsightofDennisThomas,
aformerChairmanoftheTexasPUC.AlongwithWillGuild,RonLehrer,
TheEuropean-wideDP
TomorrowsEurope
isbasedontheworkoftwo
extraordinarycollaborators,StephenBoucherandHenriMonceau,both
fromNotreEuropeatthetime.TheycreatedaEuropean-widedelibera-
tionfortheplanningandimplementationofaprojectwhosescopehad
neverbeenrealizedbefore.Theysurmountedeverydauntingchallenge
superbly.
Thevideowhichaccompaniesthisbook,EuropeinOneRoom,Žis
theworkofEmmyAwardwinningLondondocumentarymakersPaladin
Invision(PITV).MythankstoBillCran,CliveSydall,AnneTyerman,and
allthoseatPITVwhoturnedouttodosuchsuperbwork,notonlyin
coordinatingthetelevisioncoverageoftheweekendbutalsoinproducing
acompellingnarrative.
Therearetoomanyothercollaboratorsandsupporterstolistherebut
manyarementionedinthetext.Ido,however,wanttoespeciallythank
ShantoIyengarforconceivingoftheideathatIcouldmovemyresearch
programtoStanfordandestablishtheCenterforDeliberativeDemocracy.
Inaddition,thenDeanSharonLongandthenAssociateDeanKarenCook
deservespecialthanks.Twovisionariesinthefoundationworld,PaulBrest
I.Formsofconsultation
II.Optionsinthetrilemma
III.Fourdemocratictheories
IV.Preferenceformationandmodesofdecision
V.Participationandopinion
VI.DeliberativePolls,1994…2008
III.Fourdemocratictheories(fromChapter3)
VII.Sixteenpossiblepositions
DemocraticAspirations
Democracygivesvoicetowethepeople.ŽWethinkitshouldinclude
allŽthepeople.AndwethinkitshouldprovideabasisforthepeopleŽ
thinkingabouttheissuestheydecide.Thesetwopresumptionsabout
democracyareoftenunstated.Whilemostpeoplewouldadmitthey
areessentialconditionsfordemocracy,thedif“cultyofrealizingthem
incombinationislargelyunexamined.Howtodosoisthesubjectof
thisbook.
Oursubjectishowtoachieve
deliberativedemocracy
:howtoinclude
everyoneunderconditionswheretheyareeffectivelymotivatedtoreally
thinkabouttheissues.Thisistheproblemofhowtoful“lltwofunda-
mentalvalues„politicalequalityanddeliberation.
Weliveinanageofdemocraticexperimentation„bothinourof“-
cialinstitutionsandinthemanyinformalwaysinwhichthepublicis
WhenthePeopleSpeak
opinionbyusingfocus-group-testedmessagesinorderlatertoinvoke
thosesameopinionsasademocraticmandate.
Fromthestandpointof
somedemocratictheoriesthesepracticesareentirelyappropriate.They
DemocraticAspirations
thepersuasionindustry.Ademocracyinwhichweallhadsubstantive
WhenthePeopleSpeak
TheymaybejusttopoftheheadŽimpressionsofsoundbitesand
headlinesortheymayevenbeclosetonon-attitudesorphantomopin-
DemocraticAspirations
Theenormousgrowthin“nancingofcampaignadsintheUnitedStates
fromlegallyindependentgroups(527groupsnamedafterasectionof
theIRScode)addsmanymoreopportunitiesforthemanipulationof
publicopinion.Normallythedisincentivetoattackanopponentora
policyproposalisthatacandidatecanbeheldresponsibleforgoing
negativeor,worse,formisleadingordistortingtherecordsofopponents.
Butunderthemiasmaoflegalindependence,thereisanewformof
whatiscalled,inthenationalsecuritycontext,
WhenthePeopleSpeak
JamesMadisontheorized.Butthetechnologyofthepersuasionindustry
hasmadeitpossibleforelitestoshapeopinionandtheninvokethose
opinionsinthenameofdemocracy.Techniquesofpersuasiontestedin
DemocraticAspirations
WhenthePeopleSpeak
DemocraticAspirations
FromAthenstoAthens
OnacrispsummermorninginJune2006,ascienti“csampleof160
randomlychosencitizensgatheredinasuburbofAthenstoselecta
candidateformayor.Thequestionwaswhowouldbetheof“cialcandi-
daterepresentingoneofGreecestwomajorparties,theleft-centerparty
PASOK.GeorgePapandreou,thenationalpartyleader,haddecidedto
employDeliberativePolling,
ratherthanadecisionbypartyelitesor
amassprimary,toof“ciallyselectitscandidateinMarousi,theportionof
WhenthePeopleSpeak
inAthenstodeliberateandthenof“ciallymakeanimportantpublic
Theprocess“tthepatternofotherDeliberativePolls:“rstarandom
sampleofapopulation(inthiscaseeligiblevoters)respondedtoatele-
DemocraticAspirations
Thisprojectbroughttolifeamodernversionofanancientpoliticallife-
form,onethatwasthedistinctivepracticeinancientAthens.Inthe“fth
andfourthcenturiesBC,Atheniancitizenschosenbylotwouldgather
WhenthePeopleSpeak
scalewhereindividualvoicescanseemimportantenoughtoeffectively
motivateindividualeffort.
OnemightthinkthatancientAthenspresentedadifferentsituation,
onethatwasfreeofthisproblemofsocialscale.Itisoftendiscussed
DemocraticAspirations
aliens)wereallleftout.Still,theAthenianshadanideathatprovided
deliberativedemocracyforitscitizenryonahumanscale.Anditwasa
scalethatwasnotlimitedinsizetothecity-state.
TheseAthenianpracticesweredistinctiveforcombiningtwokey
ideas„randomsamplinganddeliberation.Bothhavesincelosttheir
prominenceinthedesignofdemocraticinstitutions(althoughrandom
samplinghasbeenembeddedinourunof“cialpoliticallifethroughcon-
ventionalpublicopinionpolling).Andtheideaofcombiningrandom
samplingwithdeliberationwaslargelylostthroughoutthehistoryof
democraticpractice.
Interestinthecombinationisarecentphenom-
enon,partoftherevivalofinterestindeliberativedemocracy.
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Deliberativeorre“nedŽpublicopinion(Itakethetermre“nedŽfrom
Madisonsfamousphrasein
No.10referringtorepresentatives
servingtore“neandenlargethepublicviewsŽ)canbethoughtof
DemocraticAspirations
withdirectdemocracy(andwereoriginallyofferedbyGeorgeGallupasa
proxyfordirectdemocracy„eventothepointthattheywere“rstcalled
samplingreferendaŽ
)pollsemploystatisticalsamplestostandfor,or
represent,therestofthepublic.ThemembersofsucharepresentativeŽ
sampleareselectedbyarandomscienti“cprocessratherthanbyan
election.ButtheyarestillrepresentativeŽofthemasspublic;theyare
asmallbodythatstandsfortherest,themuchlargerelectorateofmass
WhenthePeopleSpeak
DemocraticAspirations
nomatterhowthoughtfulorvirtuousthecitizenrymightbe.AsMadison
saidin
No.55,hadeveryAtheniancitizenbeenaSocrates,
everyAthenianassemblywouldstillhavebeenamob.ŽAkeydesideratum
intheFoundersprojectofconstitutionaldesignwasthecreationof
conditionswheretheformulationandexpressionofdeliberativepublic
opinionwouldbepossible.
The“ltercanbethoughtofastheprocessofdeliberationthrough
whichrepresentatives,inface-to-facediscussion,maycometoconsidered
judgmentsaboutpublicissues.Forourpurposes,wecanspecifyaworking
notionofdeliberation:face-to-facediscussionbywhichparticipantscon-
WhenthePeopleSpeak
DemocraticAspirations
couldreallybejoined.Thereferendumwasobjectedto,inotherwords,
onthegroundsthatitwouldproducedefectivedeliberation.Byhold-
WhenthePeopleSpeak
ofdemocracy,embodiedinreferendaandotherinstitutionsofmass
democracythatmirrorpublicopinionasitis,withallitsdefects.Of
course,democraticinstitutionstypicallywillofferamixofdeliberative
andmassdemocracy,amixofthe“lterandthemirror,butoverthelast
twocenturiesofdemocraticexperienceinAmerica(andindeedinmost
developeddemocracies)thebalancehasshiftedtowardfargreatermass
in”uenceinthemix„fargreaterdeferencetowardrawpublicopinion(as
opposedtore“nedormoredeliberativeviews).
IntheUnitedStates,considerwhathashappenedtotheElectoralCol-
lege(intendedasaplacefordeliberatingelectors),theelectionofsenators
(onceconductedbystatelegislatures),thepresidentialnominationsystem
(oncedominatedbypartyelites),thedevelopmentandtransformationof
thenationalpartyconventions(nowpreordainedintheirresults),therise
ofreferenda(whereplebiscitaryinstitutionssupplantelitedecisions)and
thepervasivenessofpublicopinionpolling.ManyaspectsofMadisonian
“ltrationŽhavedisappearedinasystemthatincreasinglymirrorsŽpub-
licopinionconstrainedbyrationalignorance.Intheseandmanyother
ways,therehasbeenasteadilyincreasingroleforthere”ectedŽpublic
opinionofthemirrorratherthanthere”ectiveŽpublicopinionofthe
“lter.
ThesamedilemmafacedbytheFederalistsandAnti-Federalistsatthe
birthoftheUSConstitutionhasresonanceswithcurrenteffortstobuild
anewconstitutionalstructurefortheEuropeanUnion(EU).Justasonly
onestatevoteddirectlybyreferendumontheUSConstitution,Rhode
Island,turningitdown,onlyonestatevoteddirectlybyreferendumon
theLisbonTreaty,Ireland,andalsoturneditdown.Theimpassehas
notbeenresolvedatthiswritingbutitshowsthefundamentaldilemma:
elitedeliberationcontinuestobewidelyviewedasundemocratic(hence
theEUsfamousdemocraticde“citŽ)whiledirectmassconsultation
connectswithtopoftheheadŽopinionthatmaywellbeuninformed.
HighgaspricesverylikelyhadmoretodowiththeEUtreatybeing
defeatedthanthemeritsoftheproposedreform.Inrecentyears,con-
alsobeinformedaboutwhattheyareconsentingto.
DemocraticAspirations
Publicopinion
1.Self-selection
2.Nonrandom
3.Random
4.EveryoneŽ
A.Raw
1ASLOPs
2ASomepolls
3AMostpolls
4AReferendum
B.Re“ned
1BDiscussion
2BCitizens
3BDeliberative
4BDeliberation
WhenthePeopleSpeak
DemocraticAspirations
theShout,wherecandidatescouldpackthehallandtheonewhogot
themostapplausewastheoneelected.
Laterwewillturntoadifferent
categorythatrealizesAthenianratherthanSpartandemocracy.
Thedif“cultywithCategory1Aisthatitoffersapictureofpublic
opinionthatisneitherrepresentativenordeliberative.Itoffersapicture
ofrawopinionthatisdistortedandpartialinwhomitincludes.SLOPs
achieveneitherofthetwovalueswearediscussinghere.
AnalternativetotheSLOPsofCategory1Aisthepossibilityofseri-
ousdeliberationamongaself-selectedgroup.Discussiongroups“llout
Category1B.Ifthediscussiongroupsoffertheopportunitytoweighthe
mainalternativeargumentsthatfellowcitizenswantraisedonanissue,
thentheycanachieveameasureofdeliberationonanissueevenifthe
WhenthePeopleSpeak
GeneralElection,havebeenblamedatleastinpartontheuseofquota
DemocraticAspirations
onlydramatizedonehornofthedilemmaofdemocraticreformwehave
beenexploring.Hethoughtthatthemediawould,ineffect,putthe
wholecountryinoneroomandthepollwouldallowforanassessment
oftheresultinginformedopinion.Butifthewholecountrywasinone
room,heneglectedtorealizetheeffectsofrationalignoranceŽ„the
roomwassobigthatnoonewaspayingmuchattention.Insteadofthe
WhenthePeopleSpeak
themirrorwiththe“lter.Theparticipantsturnedupbyrandomsampling,
whobeginasamirrorofthepopulation,aresubjectedtothe“lterofa
deliberativeexperience.
Everyaspectoftheprocessisdesignedtofacilitateinformedandbal-
anceddiscussion.Aftertakinganinitialsurvey,participantsareinvitedfor
aweekendofface-to-facedeliberation;theyaregivencarefullybalanced
DemocraticAspirations
WhenthePeopleSpeak
publicof,say,alleligiblevoters.Whenitcanmakeaclaimtobothkinds
ofvalidity,DeliberativePollinghasastrongbasisforrepresentingthe
consideredjudgmentsofthepeople.Weattempttousesocialsciencein
theserviceofdemocracy„togivecredibilitytotheclaimthatthere“ned
butcounterfactualopinionisrepresentativenotofactualdebilitatedopin-
ionbutofthedeliberativeopinionthepublicwouldhaveundergood
However,eveninthebestcaseforrealizingCategory3Bthereisa
limitationtowhatisaccomplished.DeliberativePollinginvolvesonlya
scienti“crandomsampleofthepopulation.Thethoughtfulandinformed
viewscreatedintheexperimentarenotwidelysharedbecausethe
bulkofthepublicisstill,inalllikelihood,disengagedandinattentive
preciselybecauseitissubjecttoallofthefourlimitationsdiscussed
earlier,limitationsthatroutinelyapplytotheopinionsofcitizensin
thelarge-scalenation-state.DeliberativePollingovercomesthosecon-
ditions,atleastforatime,foramicrocosm,butleavestherestofthe
populationlargelyuntouched(wesaylargelysincetherestofthepop-
ulationmaywellwitnesstheprocessthroughthemedia).Deliberative
Polling,liketheconventionalpollingofCategory3A,achievesinclusion
throughpoliticalequality,throughanequalcountingofthoserandomly
sampled„effectivelyofferingeachpersoninthepopulationsampled
DemocraticAspirations
nothingtoimprovethelevelofknowledgeorengagementamongvoters,
asopposedtothelevelofparticipation.
Australianelectionsshowasmuchrawpartisanshipandstrategic
manipulationasthoseinothermassdemocracies.Nearuniversalturnout
doesnotraisethelevelofdiscourseorprovideanythinglikewhatwe
arecallingre“nedŽpreferences.TheAustralianProgressivesidealistically
advocatedcompulsoryvotingonthegroundsthatifcitizensonlyknew
theyhadtovotetheywoulddothehardworktoprepare.However,the
resulthasbeentoforcevoterswithlowinformationlevelstothepolls.
Hencecompulsoryvotinghascertainlynotservedtosigni“cantlyraise
thelevelofknowledge(andthelikelihoodofdeliberativepreferences)in
elections.Onemightevenarguethatithasloweredit.
Thelastpossibility,4B,isthemostambitious.BruceAckermanandI
developedittostartadialogueabouthowtobringdeliberativepublic
opiniontothemassscale„howtomakethedeliberativepublicopinion
weseeintheDeliberativePollanactualrealityratherthanarepresenta-
tionofthemoreinformedandengagedpublicthatwedonotnowhave.
Conventionalpolling(3A)usesarandomlyselectedmicrocosmtoshow
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Candidatesforthemajorpartieswouldmakepresentationstransmitted
bynationalmediaandlocalsmallgroupdiscussionswouldidentifykey
questionsthatwouldbedirectedtolocalpartyrepresentativesinrelatively
DemocraticAspirations
experimentsliketheDeliberativePollofferthemostpracticalopportunity
forovercomingthelimitationsofmassdemocracyandgivingvoiceto
thepublicsconsideredjudgmentsundergoodconditions.However,these
possibilities,andtheschemewithinwhichtheyareplaced,areofferednot
assolutions,butasacontributiontothecontinuingdialogueabouthow
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
HowamIincluded?
Sofarwehavefocusedonprospectsforachievingpoliticalequality
anddeliberation.Butwebeganwiththerootnotionsofinclusionand
thoughtfulness.Andpoliticalequalityisnottheonlyapproachtoinclu-
sion.Anothervenerabletraditionwouldmarryinclusiontothevalue
ofmassparticipation.TheDeliberativePollincludesŽpeoplethrough
randomsampling.IamincludedwhenIamoneofthepeoplewhohas
anequalchanceofbeingchosen.Butsomedemocraticreformerswould
insistonactualmassparticipationasaformofinclusion„perhapsbest
combinedwithpoliticalequality.IamincludedwhenIvote(orperhaps
whenIhavethesameopportunitytovoteasanyoneelse).Fromthis
perspectivewehavethreecorevalues,notjustthetwodiscussedsofar„
politicalequality,deliberation,andmassparticipation.Whynotattempt
toachieveallthree?Ifoneisaspiringtoachieveinclusion,politicalequal-
itywouldseemimportantsinceitrequiresinclusiononanequalbasis„
equalcountingofonesviews.Buttheequalcountingisnotexplicitly
linkedtoindividualbehavior.Forthatreasonitdoesnotseemtobea
proxyforanykindofactualmassconsent.IfIdonotparticipate,butam
ratheroneofthepeoplewhohadarandomchanceofbeingchosen,there
isasenseinwhichIdonotindividuallyfeelincluded.Theindicationsof
inclusion,whileperhapsaseffectiveasfromactualmassparticipation,are
neverthelessnotverytangible.
Ofcourse,ifthesampleisagoodmicrocosm,thenpeople
mewill
beincluded.TheargumentsIwouldmakewilllikelybemadebythem.
TheconcernsIwouldraisewilllikelyberaisedbythem.ButifIactually
votedorparticipated,thenthereisasensethatmyactualactionsoffered
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
mychance.WithoutmassparticipationthesenseinwhichIhaveasayis
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Information
:Theextenttowhichparticipantsaregivenaccessto
reasonablyaccurateinformationthattheybelievetoberelevantto
theissue
Substantivebalance
:Theextenttowhichargumentsofferedbyone
sideorfromoneperspectiveareansweredbyconsiderationsoffered
bythosewhoholdotherperspectives
:Theextenttowhichthemajorpositionsinthepublicare
representedbyparticipantsinthediscussion
:Theextenttowhichparticipantssincerelyweigh
themeritsofthearguments
Equalconsideration
:Theextenttowhichargumentsofferedbyall
participantsareconsideredonthemeritsregardlessofwhichpar-
ticipantsofferthem
Achievingthese“veconditionstoahighdegreedistinguishesdelibera-
tionfrommuchordinaryconversation.Democraticdeliberationisabout
questionsofcollectivepoliticalwill„aboutwhatshouldbedone.Itis
aboutarrivingatviewsthatrepresentcollective,informedconsent.What
combinationofbene“tsandburdens,oroffavorableorunfavorable
factorsapplyingtoanoption,wouldthepublicbepreparedtolivewith?
Justaswhenindividualsofferinformedconsenttoamedicaloralegal
procedure,wethinktheyshouldknowwhattheyareagreeingto,and
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
WhenthePeopleSpeak
aboutAscharacteriftheresponsestothosecriticismsarenotaired?
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
andthenumbersaffected.Putsimply,adeliberationwithoutsubstantive
balancewouldbeimpaired,becausetheconsiderationsthatweighforand
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Itisworthnotingthatweareleavingmorepreciseclaimsofrepre-
sentativenesstothecriterionofpoliticalequality.Ifeveryoneisequally
represented,eitherbyhavingtheentirepopulationparticipateorthrough
randomsampling,thenthediversitycriterionwillautomaticallybesatis-
“ed.Wede“neditintermsofadiversityofviewpointscomparabletothe
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
WeaddressedthisissuebyoversamplingAboriginalsandrandomly
assigningtheoversampletoarandomhalfofallthesmallgroups.As
itturnedout,allthegroupsmovedinthesamedirection(broadlytoward
policiespromotingreconciliationwiththeAboriginalpopulation).But
thegroupsthathadmoreAboriginalsinthemmovedmoreinthatdirec-
tion.Thisresultsuggestedtheimportanceofhavingviewpointsactually
voicedbytherelevantparticipants.Butitalsoshowedthatbalanceddelib-
erationwaspossibleevenwhentherewasanimpairmentinthedegreeof
diversityinthesmallgroups.
Onemighthavearguedforgreaterover-
samplinginordertoimprovethedeliberationbutnotethattheoversam-
plingunderminesclaimstorepresentativeness(orinthetermsdeveloped
here,politicalequality).
Forthatreason,theinstitutionalaspirations
fortheDeliberativePollwouldsuggestthatitisgenerallypreferableto
maintainrandomsamplinganddealwiththespecialcasewhereasmall
populationistheexplicitsubjectofthedeliberationthroughthebrie“ng
materialsandthebalanceofexpertsintheplenarysessions.However,
thereareclearlytrade-offs.
Thereasonformaintainingrandomsamplingisthatthekeyclaim
oftheDP,andindeed,asweshallsee,thekeyclaimofdeliberative
democracymoregenerally,isthesimultaneousrealizationofdelibera-
tionandpoliticalequality.Departuresfromrandomsamplingdistortor
underminetheclaimtopoliticalequalityeveniftheymight,underthese
circumstances,contributetothefurtherrealizationofdeliberation.
Afourthconditionisconscientiousness.Deliberationrequiresthatpar-
ticipantssincerelyweightheissuesontheirmerits.Theyshoulddecidein
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Ifparticipantsspendhourstryingtodecidewhattheythink,andifthey
believethatthereisareasonwhywhattheythinkwillmatter,thenit
seemsplausiblethatthedeliberatorswilloffertheirsincereviewsatthe
endoftheprocess.
Ordinarycitizenshavelessopportunitytobargain(atleastundermost
institutionaldesigns)andlessopportunitytobehavestrategically(atleast
withanyconsequence)thandopoliticalelites.Ordinarycitizensholdan
of“ce(citizen)forwhichtheyarenotrunningforelection.Theyhaveno
needtospindoctortheirpositionsinordertogainadvantage.Ofcourse
theyaresubjecttosocialpressureandsincetheyareofteninattentive,
theyarevulnerabletomanipulation,butwecanusuallyassumetheir
responsestowell-designeddeliberativeconsultationsaregenuine.
ThereissomesuggestiveevidencethatDPsmotivatesincereratherthan
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
deliberativeprocessitself.Totheextentthathappensitwouldseemplau-
sibletoconcludethatparticipantsarenotweighingtheconsiderations
WhenthePeopleSpeak
meritsofargumentstomakethebestjudgmentsonecanaboutthe
means…endsrelationsofkeypropositions.Forexample,supposeIam
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
theyhadheardtheotherside.Iftheyfailtoconsidertheissueonits
meritsbutdecideforsomeotherreason,orifinequalitiesprivilegesome
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Notethatintermsofhavinganequalchanceofbeingthedecisivevoter,
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
votingpowerwitharequirementthatitbeappliedtopublicconsulta-
WhenthePeopleSpeak
tobeahighlevelofmassparticipation,theremustbeparticipationon
thepartofthebulkofthepopulation.
Aswewillsee,sometheoristsdonotseemassparticipationasagood
tobeencouraged.Fromthisperspective,massparticipationisathreat.
Thepeoplehavepassionsorinterests,whichifaroused,canmotivate
factions,canmotivatemob-likebehaviorthatmaydoharmtotherights
ofothers.TheoriginaldesignoftheUSConstitutionwasintendedto“lter
thepublicviewsandthroughanindirectprocess,leadtothedistillationof
publicopinionratherthanpermitanydirectimpactonpoliticsorpolicy.
Fromotherperspectives,however,massparticipationisacornerstoneof
democracy.Massparticipationsignalsaformofmassconsent.Whenthe
Politicalequality
Optionone:
Massdemocracy
Optiontwo:
Mobilizeddeliberation
Optionthree:
Microcosmicdeliberation
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
innovationortechnology,wecanreliablyexpectthetrilemmapatternto
hold.Ithasheldthroughoutthelonghistoryofdemocraticexperimen-
tation.Therehasnever,inotherwords,beenaninstitutionthatreliably
deliveredpoliticalequality,deliberation,andmassparticipationsimulta-
neously.Conventionalelectionsofrepresentatives,whenconductedwith
politicalequality,deliverthecombinationofpoliticalequalityandmass
participationatonestageandthenseparatedeliberationbypoliticalelites
inanotherstage.Referendadeliverparticipationandpoliticalequalitybut
routinelyfailtoofferdeliberationatthesametime.Therehavebeen
historicaloccasions,suchastheconstitutionalmomentsŽstudiedby
Ackerman,whenthewholecountryisarousedtodiscussanissue,but
thosemomentsarenotreliablydeliveredbyaninstitution,theyoccur
unpredictably.
Totheextentthetrilemmaholdsforthedesignofinsti-
tutions,democraticreformersfacesomedif“cultvaluechoices.
Massdemocracy
WhenthePeopleSpeak
appliesequallywelltoselectionbylotorbyrandomsampleasitdoes
tomassvotinginareferendumorelectioninwhichvotesarecounted
equally.Thenotionofanequalchancetobethedecisivevotercanbe
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
Thisproblem„thatthereislittlerationalmotivationforcitizensto
deliberateaboutpublicissuesinmassdemocracies„doesnotdepend
oncitizensbeingsel“shormerelyself-interested.Evenifcitizenshave
WhenthePeopleSpeak
choosetoparticipateareunrepresentativeoftheentireelectorate.
Inthe
UnitedStates,thosewhoactuallyparticipatearegenerallymorewhite,
moreprosperous,andmoreeducatedbyfarthanthosewhodonot.In
thatsense,effectivepoliticalequalityhasbeenachievedfarlessthanthe
breakdownofformalbarrierstoparticipation(intermsofvotingrights)
wouldsuggest.Astrongclaimofpoliticalequalitywouldattempttomin-
imizeparticipatorydistortion,makingthosewhochoosetoparticipate
asmuchliketheentireelectorateaspossible.Bytheentireelectoratewe
meantheelectorateofeligiblenotjustregisteredvoters.TheUnitedStates
istheonlycountryintheworldtoputtheentireburdenofregistrationon
individualvoterssothatregistrationbecomes,initself,abarriertopartici-
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
distortion„whichisanotherwayofsayingthattheyrealizepolitical
equalityaswellasparticipation.
Participatorydistortionmayevenhavebeenincreasedbyeffortsto
furtheropenupthepoliticalprocessandincreasetheopportunitiesfor
publicconsultation.Lowturnoutreferenda,theproliferationofmass
WhenthePeopleSpeak
ofthoseelectionsifwesomehowgotthenonvoterstovote.
Whilethe
nonvotersareevenlesswellinformedthanthevoters,theirpolicyand
politicalpreferences,totheextentthattheyhavethem,tendtoechoor
re”ectmuchthesameviewsasthoseofvoters.Onthisbasis,Wol“nger
andRosenstonearguedinaclassicdiscussionthatitwouldnotmake
muchdifferencetotheoutcomesofelectionsifnonvotersvoted.Onthis
view,participatorydistortionŽdoesnotreallydistortmuch,becauseit
doesnot,intheend,changetheoutcomeofelections.
Dependingontheelectionandtheissue,thereisclearlysomemerit
tothisargument.However,italsodemonstratestheproblemoftaking
politicalequalityandparticipationinisolationfromdeliberation.For
ifweimaginenonvotersvoting„andalsodiscussingtheissues„before
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
democracy.AnambitiousandexpensiveinnovationlikeDeliberationDay
mightbreakthetrilemma,atleastforaday,butthiswouldrequirethe
politicalwilltomakealargechangeOfcourse,thelimitationsofmass
democracyonlydramatizehowsuchaninnovationmightbeworththe
Mobilizeddeliberation
Supposeweattemptanotherpairing„participationcombinedwithdelib-
eration.Inrecentyears,therehavebeenanumberofnotableefforts
topursuethisstrategy,whichwemaycall
mobilizeddeliberation
.These
effortsareworthwhileinthattheycontributetotheciviceducationand
deliberativepotentialofthousandsofcitizens.Buttheyaremodestin
that,thusfar,theyhaveaffectedmanythousands,butnotmillions,ina
nationinwhichthemasspublicconsistsofmillionsofvoters.Thestrat-
egyistheencouragementofthemasspublictoparticipateindeliberative
forums.Theencouragementconsistsintheprovisionofinfrastructureto
makeseriousdeliberationpossible.Theinfrastructureisthedevelopment
ofcarefullybalanced,nonpartisanbrie“ngmaterialssuitableforcitizen
deliberation,thetrainingofmoderatorswhocanleaddeliberativeforums,
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Studiesoftheseself-selecteddeliberativeforumscon“rmmuchthe
samepatternasamongmicrocosmicdeliberations,suchastheDeliber-
ativePolls,orwithsmallernumbers,theCitizensJuries.Variousstudies
showthattheparticipantsdemonstrateincreasedknowledge,increased
ef“cacy,signi“cantopinionchange,andincreasedsophisticationintheir
politicalviews.
However,theself-selectedcharacteroftheseforums
mustinevitablyhavesomeeffectonthedeliberation.Self-selectionis
likelytolimitthediversityofparticipantsandmayalsohelpattractpeo-
plewhohavesomespecialreasontobeinterestedinagiventopic.Unlike
DeliberativePollsorCitizensJuries(orDeliberationDay),theparticipants
arenotpaidsigni“cantincentivesnoraretheygeneratedbyanyformof
scienti“csampling.Withoutsuchefforts,theycaneasilyaccommodate
largernumbers,henceservingthevalueofmassparticipation.
Myassumptionhereisthatitwouldnotbepossibletoreliablymotivate
millionstodeliberatewithouteitherincentivesorcompulsion.Compul-
sorydeliberationraisescon”ictswithlibertythatwouldseemtoputitoff-
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
ofthepopulationandiftheviewsofeachpersoninthemicrocosmcount
equallyinwhatevertabulationordecisionprocesstakesplace.Delibera-
tivePollingisanefforttorealizethiskindofmicrocosmicdeliberation.
However,itisnottheonlypossibleversion.Thereareothervariantson
thesamebasicidea.Themostprominentare:CitizensJuries,Planning
Cells,DeliberativePanels,ConsensusConferences,andTelevote.Eachhas
advantagesanddisadvantagesbuttheyallaspiretoofferrepresentative
deliberationsbyamicrocosmofthepublic.
TheidealofmicrocosmicdeliberationwassuggestivelyexpressedbyJ.S.
Millinhisaccountoftheidealroleofalegislature„toactaswhathe
calledaCongressofOpinionsŽ:
Whereeverypersoninthecountrymaycountupon“ndingsomebodywho
WhenthePeopleSpeak
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
pursues.Smallgroupsareconvenedinthesamelocationforsuccessive
weekends,eachforadayofdeliberationonthesametopic.Afterseven
oreightofthese,thenumbersmaybelargeenoughforstatistically
signi“cantconclusionstoemerge.Providedtheworlddoesnotchange
insomedramaticwayontheissueinquestionduringtheweeksof
deliberation,andprovidedthateffortsaremadetokeeptheexperiences
WhenthePeopleSpeak
onthephoneandthensentmaterialsontheissue.Theyareurgedto
discussthetopicintheirhomes,withfriendsandfamily.Then,atalater
time,theyarecalledbacktoseewhattheiropinionsareafterfurther
thoughtanddiscussion.AmeritofTelevoteisthatitemploysscienti“c
randomsamplingratherthanself-selectionasinConsensusConferences
orthequotasamplingtypicalofCitizensJuries.Adif“culty,however,
isthatthedeliberationencouragedbytheschemeismodest.Evenfor
thoserespondentswhodoactuallyreadthematerialsanddiscussthe
issuewithfriendsandfamily,theeffectwillusuallybetodiscussthe
issuewiththelike-minded.Aswehaveseen,oneoftheprincipalde“-
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
itsopinionchangescanbestudiedstatistically.ComparedtothePlanning
CellsandtheDeliberativePanels,ithasthemeritthatitcombinesunity
ofspaceandtime.Itputsthewholecountry(orthewholeregionorthe
wholestateorthewholetown)inoneroomwhereitcanthink.This
allowsforadramaticeventthatthemediacancoverandithelpsrender
thesmallgroupscomparable.ComparedtoTelevoteandtheChoice
Questionnaire,itoffersamoreintensiveintervention,onethatallows
peopletoexperiencedialoguewithagreaterdiversityofviewsoveramore
extensiveperiodandonethatalsoofferstheprospectofmoresubstantive
balance.Withbothmoretimeandgreaterdiversityinaninteractive
WhenthePeopleSpeak
onlythroughtheirbeingequallyconsideredviarandomsampling.There
isnotokenofactualmassparticipation.Inthecaseofthethirdoption,
deliberationandparticipation,wecanreliablyexpectparticipatorydis-
tortionŽoralackofequalcountingunderminingrepresentativeness.Itis
mostlycertaingroupswhoareespeciallyinterestedwhowillparticipate.
Therestwillbeleftout.Undermostforeseeablepracticalconditions,one
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
receivedadequatetreatment,butitisusuallydiscussedassomekindof
fundamentalinjustice.
Fearofmajoritytyrannywasoneoftheprincipalmotivationsfor
theoriginaldesignoftheUSConstitution.Famously,Madisondidnot
embracethetermdemocracyŽpreferringrepublic,Žbywhichhemeant
agovernmentinwhichtheschemeofrepresentationtakesplace.ŽBy
contrast,inthesmallface-to-facedemocracyoftheancientcity-states,a
puredemocracyŽwithoutrepresentation(hebelieved),therewasnocure
forthemischiefsoffaction.Acommonpassionorinterestwill,inalmost
everycase,befeltbyamajorityofthewhole...thereisnothingtocheck
theinducementstosacri“cetheweakerpartyoranobnoxiousindividualŽ
No.10).TherationalefortheSenatewasthataninstitution
WhenthePeopleSpeak
ButHamilton,atleast,didnotbelievethecourtswouldproveastrong
bulwarkagainstmajorityfactions.Hedidnotthinkitlikelythatjudges
wouldhavethefortitudeŽtodotheirdutyasguardiansofthe
Constitution,wherelegislativeinvasionsofithadbeeninstigatedbythe
majorvoiceofthecommunityŽ(
No.73).
TheFramerswereclearlyhauntedbythepossibilitythatfactions
arousedbypassionsorinterestsadversetotherightsorinterestsofothers,
coulddoverybadthings.Theimagetheyfearedseemstobesomecom-
binationoftheAthenianmobandShayssrebellion.TyrannyŽofthe
majorityisonlylooselyspeci“ed,buttheywereclearlyfearfulofsubstan-
tialandavoidabledeprivationscommittedagainstlife,liberty,orproperty.
Whilethesenotionsaresuggestive,weneedaworkingde“nitionhere
ofthosegovernmentdecisionsthatwouldbesounacceptablethatthere
wouldbeoverridingnormativeclaimsagainstthemevenwhentheywere
otherwisesupportedbydemocraticprinciples.
Forourpurposes,wecansaythat
TheTrilemmaofDemocraticReform
consequencesaresuf“cientlydirethedecisioncouldcountastyrannyof
themajorityŽorindeed,minority(dependingonthesizeofthecoalition
neededtoblocknewaction)eventhoughtheconsequencesinquestion
weretheresultofanactionnottaken(theexplicitdecisionnottooffer
disasterrelief).
Tohaveafullydevelopedaccountofnon-tyranny(oroftyrannyof
themajority)onewouldneedasubstantivediscussionforclassifyingthe
unacceptableseveredeprivationsthatarevisiteduponthelosers.Forour
purposesherewecantalkoflossofhumanrightsthatareessentialfor
survivalorhumandignityorharmstoessentialinterests.Ihavedeveloped
onesuchaccountelsewhere.However,wedonotneedthediscussion
heretodependonanyspeci“caccount.Wejustneedtospecifytheidea
thatnon-tyrannyisviolatedwhenapolicyischosenthatimposessevere
deprivationswhenanalternativepolicywouldnothavedoneso.Atleast
thatde“nitioncansignalenoughofthekeycasesforustoproceed.How
todealwithdif“cultcaseswhereeverypossiblealternativeimposessevere
deprivationsonsomeoneisamoredif“cultsubjectfor(nonideal)theories
ofjustice.
Therehavebeeneffortstodevelopanaccountoftyrannyofthemajor-
itywithoutanysubstantivediscussionofeffects.Inhisclassic
APreface
toDemocraticTheory
,RobertDahlofferedthebalanceofintensitiesasa
modernanaloguetoMadisonsdiscussion.Theideaisthatifaminority
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Participatory
Politicalequality
WhenthePeopleSpeak
WhenthePeopleSpeak
willleadtoanarousedpublicthatmightdobadthingsand,hence,com-
mittyrannyofthemajority.Theideaisthatthereisapossible(andoften
WhenthePeopleSpeak
thedangerofsuchafaction,andatthesametimetopreservethespirit
andtheformofpopulargovernment,isthenthegreatobjecttowhich
ourinquiriesaredirected.Ž
NotethatMadisonhasjustidenti“edtherepublicanprincipleŽwith
majorityruleinclaimingthatminorityfactionscanbecontrolledsimply
byuseoftherepublicanprinciple.Buthowtopreservethespiritand
formofpopulargovernmentŽandatthesametimecontrolmajority
factionsisthegreatobject.Ž
Theextensivediscussionof
No.10hasbeendominatedby
thesecondoftwoargumentsheoffersinresponsetothisproblem.The
secondargumentisajustlyfamousone:
WhenthePeopleSpeak
onthespot.Itisnotthemirrorbutthe“lter.Assuchitisusuallya
counterfactualpictureofpublicopinion,heldonbehalfofthepublicby
itsrepresentatives.Butthereisasenseinwhichitcanalsobeamajority
view„whatthepublic
thinkifitwereabletoconsidertheissuein
thewaythatrepresentativescaninadeliberativebody.Itisnotjustthe
viewsoftherepresentatives,becauseitisare“nementandenlargementof
the
viewsŽnotjustthoseoftherepresentatives.Itisanapplication
oftherepublicanprincipleŽbutnottotheopinionspeopleactuallyhave
buttothosetheywouldhaveiftheycouldthinkabouttheminthesense
Madisonadvocates.
MadisonscureŽistoapplytherepublicanprincipleonlytorepresenta-
tivesre“ningdeliberativepublicopinion.Madisonbelievesthiscanbest
bediscoveredbythedeliberationsofasmallrepresentativebody,such
astheSenate,and,hopefully,theratifyingconventionstotheConstitu-
tion.Thesewere,ineffect,gatheringsaimedatdiscoveringre“nedpublic
Madisonofferstheoutlinesofapoliticalpsychologythatwouldalso
explainwhyhethinksthedeliberativeprocess,the“lter,appliedinthis
wayalsosolvesthefactionproblem.Theanswerliesinthedistinction
deliberationsbythepeoplethemselves,fordeliberationsthatsatisfynot
onlytheprincipleofdeliberationbutalsothatofpoliticalequality.The
elitedeliberationpositiondoesnotoffereachvoteranequalchanceof
beingdecisiveonsubstantivedecisions.Itonlyallowselitestorepresent
anddecide.TheMadisonianversionemphasizesdeliberationandnon-
tyrannyandwewilltakethosetwocommitmentsasitsde“ningfeatures.
Tobeclear,theMadisonianelitedeliberationpositionisdeliberation
thepeople.Thepositionwewilllateridentifyasdeliberativedemocracy
isdeliberation
thepeople.
J.S.MillsCongressofOpinionsofferssomefurtherre“nementstothe
EliteDeliberationpositionbysuggestinghowthedeliberatingelitesare
connectedtoordinarycitizens.InMillspicture,eachcitizencanseehis
WhenthePeopleSpeak
beeasiertopracticeinlargeelectorates,requiringcommunicationviathe
media,thaninverysmalloneswherevestigesofface-to-facedemocracy
TherelevanceofMadisonscureŽforourpurposeslies,“rst,in
thesuggestionthatrepresentativesmightproperlytakeaccountof
acounterfactual„whatthepublicviewsŽ
wouldbe
ifre“nedand
enlarged.ŽSecond,itliesinthefactthatwhilethisre“nedpublicopinion
maywellbecounterfactualfortheentiremasspublic,itcanbemadereal
forarepresentativegroup.ByapplyingtherepublicanprincipleinspiritŽ
tothedeliberationsofarestrictedeliteitislikelytoavoidtyrannyofthe
majorityandservethepublicinterest.
ThisaccountofMadisonsuggestsamiddlegroundintheapparent
dilemmaoftenfacingrepresentatives.
Shouldtheyfollowthepollsor
shouldtheyvotetheirownviewsofwhatisbestforthecountry(ortheir
stateordistrict)?Thiscrudedichotomydominatesthediscussionabout
howmembersofCongressandotherlegislatorsshouldapproachtheir
constituentswouldthinkaboutanissue,oncetheywerewellinformed
andgotthefacts,heardtheargumentsoneitherside,andhadarea-
sonablechancetopondertheissues.Thisviewofarepresentativesrole
providesgroundsforresistingthepressureofpollsonissuesthattherep-
resentativeknowsthepublicknowslittleabout.Ontheotherhand,this
positionisnotthesameasjusttherepresentativesownviewsontheissue
inquestion.Therepresentativemayknowthathisorhervaluesdiffer
fromthoseofconstituentsonagivenquestionorthatconstituentswould
neveracceptaparticularpolicy,evenwithagreatdealmoreinformation
anddiscussion.Therepresentativemayalsoknowhisorherconstituents
wellenoughtohavesomeideaofwhattheywouldacceptifonlytheyhad
theinformation.Thisdeferencetothecounterfactualdeliberatingpublic
providesawayofthinkingabouttherepresentativesrolethatavoidsthe
dif“cultyoffollowingthepublicsuninformedviews,ontheonehand,
andoffollowingtherepresentativesmoreinformedbut(perhaps)merely
personalviews,ontheother.
Whilethisviewoftherepresentativesroleisnotoftenexplicit,it
doessurfaceinraremomentswhenCongressorcommentatorsareself-
conscious.ConsiderSamuelBeersrecommendationstotheHouseJudi-
ciaryCommitteeduringthepreparationsfortheimpeachmenttrialof
PresidentClinton.BeersclaimwasthattheCongressisacreatureof
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Participatorydemocracy
Aswesaw,theearlyAmericanexpressionofelitedeliberationwaschal-
lengedwhentheFoundersschemefortheUSConstitutionwassubjected
toareferenduminRhodeIsland.Whilethateventwasaminorskirmish
inthebattleoverrati“cation,itisworthnotingbecauseitdramatizes
goodtacticstoemploynegativeadstoencouragedemobilizationand
lowerturnout,especiallyofyouropponentssupporters.
Ofcourse,
WhenthePeopleSpeak
notinvolvediscussion,ifitismuteandanonymous,likethemodern
WhenthePeopleSpeak
context,thereisaclearandviableposition,whichwewillcallparticipa-
torydemocracy,thatiscommittedtothecombinationofmassparticipa-
tionandpoliticalequalityandisagnosticontheothertwoprinciplesin
ourscheme.
Deliberativedemocracy
Thelastofourfourdemocratictheoriesattemptstocombinedeliberation
bythepeoplethemselveswithpoliticalequality.Aswenotedearlier,one
strategyforachievingpoliticalequalitywouldrealizeitthroughmass
participation„intheoryeveryoneparticipatesandtheirviewsaresome-
howcountedequally.Whilethisapproachhaspredominatedthrough-
outthehistoryofdemocraticreform,ithassomelimitations.First,
whenparticipationisvoluntarythereisusuallysubstantialparticipatory
instanceofsuchastrategy.However,suchaneffortisexpensiveprecisely
becauseitinvolvescoordinatingandmotivatingmanymillions.Ifpar-
ticipatorydistortionisavoidedbecausetheincentivesaregoodenough
tomotivateparticipationthroughoutallstrataofthepopulation,then
politicalequalityanddeliberationmightbothbeservedbysuchastrategy.
However,thedownsideisthecostandmassivescaleofsuchastrategy.
Thereisnoreasontothinkthattechnologywillsolvethisproblem.The
self-selectionproblem,withitsattendantparticipatorydistortionapplies
WhenthePeopleSpeak
TheideaofmicrocosmicdeliberationgoesbacktoancientAthens,
thattherewascommentaryatthetimethatthecourtsweremostly
populatedbytheoldandthepoorwhocamejusttocollectthefees.
ModernDeliberativePollsusuallyhaverelativelyfewstatisticallysignif-
WhenthePeopleSpeak
conclusionsofadeliberatingmicrocosmhaveanynormativeclaimonus?
Whyshouldtheyhaveanyrecommendingforce?
Themicrocosmexperiencesgoodconditionsforcomingtoaconsidered
judgmentabouttheissues.Ifwethink,attheindividuallevel,thatitis
morerelevanttopayattentiontoaconsideredjudgmentthanadistorted
orill-consideredone,thenwhynotalsopaymoreattentiontoour
consideredjudgments?Theyarealsomorelikelytohaveagood
basisthanthosewehavenotthoughtabout,orthoseforwhichwehave
neglectedrelevantarguments.
ConsiderJohnRawlsscharacterizationofconsideredjudgments.ŽHis
focusisonmorality,onthoseconditionswhereourmoralcapacitiescan
bedisplayedwithoutdistortion,Žbuthesaysthesameissuesapplyto
consideredjudgmentsofanykind.ŽConsideredjudgmentsarethose
madeincircumstanceswherethemorecommonexcusesandexpla-
nationsformakingamistakedonotobtain.Thepersonmakingthe
judgmentispresumedthen,tohavetheability,theopportunityandthe
desiretoreachacorrectdecision(oratleastnotthedesirenotto).Ž
Considerourcriteriaforqualitydeliberation.Theyalladdressthedis-
tortionsthatmightleadusastray.Ourcriteriawere
information
ofviewpoints,
,and
equalconsideration
theargumentsofferedontheirmerits.Lackofanyoneofthesecouldlead
WhenthePeopleSpeak
ChartIV.
Preferenceformationandmodesofdecision
Decisionrule
Modeofpreferenceformation
dif“cult„ineffectprivilegingthestatusquoasanoption.
thedegreetowhichvotingrulessatisfypoliticalequalityisnotaddressed
bythissimpledivision.Onecouldhaveaggregation,forexample,ina
systemthathadwhatMillcalledpluralvoting,Žineffectextravotesfor
somepeople.Andalternatively,therearemanypossiblewaysinwhich
consensusmightbearrivedat.Doesitcomethroughequalorunequal
publicparticipation?Howareoptionsproposedandconsidered?Whatis
theroleofanychairinthewayalternativesareposedforconsensusaf“r-
mation?Onecanthinkofmanyvariantsinthewaysinwhichaggregation
andconsensusoperate.
Withthesecomplexitiesnoted,thefourfoldtablecanservetoreveal
WhenthePeopleSpeak
meaningfulpublicwillformationbutitisactuallyjustacharade.Further-
ChartV.
Participationandopinion
WhenthePeopleSpeak
The“rstquadrant,everyoneparticipatinginadeliberativeformofpublic
opinion,suggestshowtheconsideredjudgmentsofthepeoplecouldbe
regardedascompellingiftheywerealsowidelyshared.Theideathat
deliberativedemocracyrepresentsaformofcollectiveinformedconsent
iseasiertoestablishwhenitisalso
collectiveconsent„whenevery-
one,orvirtuallyeveryone,doesactuallysharetheviewsinquestion.
Aswehaveseen,opinionsthataretosomesigni“cantdegreethe
productofdeliberationrequirethatthepersonsinquestionre”ecton
populationcanbesubdivided,aswithourDeliberationDayproposal,
envisioningmanysmallgroups.Butthisscenariorequirestheorganiza-
tionandexpenseofamassivenewkindofinstitution.Lefttoourown
WhenthePeopleSpeak
moveWestinthediagramtorealizemassconsent.Butourtendencyhas
notbeentomoveNorthandWest,butrather,tomoveeitherNortheastor
Southwest„moredeliberationbythefeworlessdeliberationbythemany.
WhentheFoundersdevelopedtheElectoralCollege,theSenate,orthe
convention,theyenvisioneddecision-makingintheNortheastdirection,
believingitwastheonlywayofrealizingdeliberation.Whendemocratic
reformers,fromthePopulistsandProgressivestothepost-McGovern…
FraserreformersofthemodernAmericanprimarysystem,institutedmore
democraticconsultation,theymovedourinstitutionsintheSouthwest-
erndirectionbelievingitwastheonlywaytorealizemassconsent.As
democracy,thatitpresumestoplacethepublicspotentialconsidered
judgmentsaboveitsactualviews.
InthisforcedchoiceIhaveignoredQuadrantIII,eliterawopinion.To
givethisverisimilitude,thinkofpoll-drivenelites.Whywouldelitesnot
actondeliberativeopinionbutratherdefertothepublicsrawopinion?
Becausethey“nddoingsoyieldselectoraladvantage.Wewillincludein
thiscategoryeventhosecaseswheretheeliteshavemanagedtomanipu-
lateorreshapeopinionforelectoraladvantageasthoseresultingopinions
arealsonondeliberative.
QuadrantIIIisreallyderivativeofQuadrantIV,
throughitsdeferencetorawmassopinion.
Anotherwayofthinkingaboutitisthatsocialscienceopensupthe
possibilityofQuadrantIIIrepresentingIVjustasQuadrantIIcanrep-
resentI.Inotherwords,ifrandomsamplingistheformofselection,
thenDeliberativePollingorotherdeliberativemicrocosms(inQuadrant
II)purporttorepresentwhatpeoplewouldchooseifeveryonedeliberated
(QuadrantI),justasconventionalpolling(awayof“llingoutQuadrant
III)purportstorepresentwhateveryoneisactuallychoosing(Quadrant
IV).OnceoneseesthatII,atitsbest,isarepresentationofI,andthatIII
WhenthePeopleSpeak
elitestheclaimisbasedonaresponsibilityentrustedtorepresentativesto
deliberateinthepublicinterest.Butwesawthatthisoriginalaspiration
oftheFoundershasgottenenmeshedinpartyandelectoralcalculations.
Representativesaspireto“lloutQuadrantIIbuttheyareoftendriven
byelectoralincentivesto“lloutQuadrantIII.EvenMadisonhimself
wentofftocofoundapoliticalparty.
Aswesaw,theideathatelected
representativesaresupposedtostandforwhattheirconstituentswould
thinkifonlytheyknewwhattherepresentativedid,surfacesoccasionally
andmayexpressasenseofresponsibilityforhowtodealwithboththe
MakingDeliberativeDemocracy
Bringingthepublicspheretolife:Fourquestions
WhenthePeopleSpeak
withstandobjection,andtoexplorepointsofentrywherethisancient
politicallifeform,suitablyupdated,can“ndamodernrole.
Projectsondifferenttopicsconductedwithvaryingkindsofsponsor-
shipsindifferentpartsoftheworldgiveusabasisforsomepreliminary
conclusions.ChartVIprovidesatimelineofeffortsbeginningwiththe
“rstDeliberativePollinBritainin1994untilthetimeofthiswriting,in
The“rstDeliberativePollswerebuiltaroundtelevisionbroadcasts,by
ChannelFourinBritainorPBSintheUnitedStates.Mediaprojects,
particularlybyPBShavecontinuedatboththenationalandlocallevels.
Butsoonothercontextssurfaced.InTexas,aseriesofDeliberativePolls
sponsoredbytheregulatedelectricutilitycompanies,inconjunctionwith
theTexasPublicUtilityCommission,ledtoaseriesofdecisionsabout
investmentsinwindpowerandconservation.
Whiletherewasamedia
MakingDeliberativeDemocracyPractical
ChartVI.
DeliberativePolls,1994…2008
Citizenship
199719981999200020012002
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
WhenthePeopleSpeak
MakingDeliberativeDemocracyPractical
anyone.Butthisalternativeisnotreallyinclusiveandleadstodomina-
tionbyorganizedinterestswhoareinevitablytheoneswhoactuallyshow
up,andatbest,issuepublics(thoseespeciallyinterestedinthetopic).
Suchdistortedparticipationmustinevitablydistortdeliberationaswell,
becauseofalackofrepresentativeness.Hencewearedrawnbacktothe
strategyofmicrocosmicdeliberation.
Howthoughtful?
Theessentialideaisforarepresentativesampletoengageinhigh-quality
deliberation.Thedrivingquestionforinstitutionaldesignis:Whatwould
thepeoplethinkundergoodconditionsforthinkingaboutit?Hencethe
wholeeffortrestsonthecredibilityofatransparentaccountofgood
conditionsŽforthinkingabouttheissue.
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Avoidingdistortions:Theproblemofdomination
Criticsofdeliberationworrythattheapparentcommitmenttoequal
considerationofeveryonesviewsontheirmeritswillinfactmaskdom-
inationoftheprocessbythemostprivileged.Theproblemisthatany
turnonmannersofspeakingandlistening.Somepeople,evenifformally
included,maynothavetheirvoices,iftheyspeakatall,takenseriously.
Theymaygiveoffcuesthatindicatetheyarenotwellinformedornot
worthlisteningto.Thosewhoareaccustomedtoeveryadvantagein
theconductoftheireverydaylivesmaybemoreassertiveinpressing
theirviewsonothersandlessopentolisteningtothosewithoutsimilar
Theymayalsobemoreaccustomedtoorderlyformsof
reason-givingargumentthatweighwithotherparticipants.Orsothe
argumentgoes.
MakingDeliberativeDemocracyPractical
theideaofdeliberationisthatparticipantsmoveinthedirectionoftheir
moreinformedopinions,thentheymaymoveinthatdirectionbecause
ofinformationeffects,notbecauseofdistortionsbyafactorextraneous
tothemeritsoftheissues,thatis,thesocialpositionsofsomeofthe
Thosecomingtothisdebatefromafeministperspectivewillbe
concernedaboutmendominating.Thosefocusedonsocioeconomic
inequalitieswillbeconcernedaboutdominationbytherichandthe
WhenthePeopleSpeak
andmaywellvarywiththepreciseinstitutionaldesignofadeliberative
process.Sunstein,however,holdsthatitwillapplygenerallytogroup
discussionprocesses.
ArelateddistortionwasmadefamousbyIrvingJaniswithhisbook
VictimsofGroupthink
Heretheargumentisthatsocialpressurefor
conformitywillleadtoaninadequateconsiderationofthearguments
ontheirmeritsundervariousconditions.Theresultwillbeconsensus
MakingDeliberativeDemocracyPractical
WhenthePeopleSpeak
samesingle-peakeddimensionsincreases,makingcycleslesslikely
orvirtuallyimpossible.Theideaisthatwhilepeoplemaynotagree
whichalternativesarebest,theydocome,throughdiscussion,to
MakingDeliberativeDemocracyPractical
MakingDeliberationConsequential
AcasefromChina
Ourfourquestionsposeadauntingchallengeforbothresearchandprac-
ticalexperimentation.Whoisincluded?Howthoughtfulistheprocess?
Whateffectsdoesithaveandunderwhatconditions?
Tofocusdiscussion,considerthesequestionsappliedinanunlikely
place,localdecision-makinginatowninChina.At“rstglancesuch
MakingDeliberationConsequential
theproblemofmakingachoiceamongqualitativelydifferentkinds
ofexpenditure„forlocalroads,highways,anewtownsquare,sewage
treatmentplants,variouskindsofparks,acomprehensiveenvironmental
Townof“cialshadalong-standinginterestinpublicconsultationabout
suchissues.TherewasalocaltraditionofKentan,Žofconveningheart
WhenthePeopleSpeak
ofmalesintheinitialsample
theparticipantsamplewasalmostthesame
MakingDeliberationConsequential
discussion.ThislawofgrouppolarizationŽholdsthatifagroupstartsout
ononesideofthemidpoint,itwillmovefurtherawayfromthemidpoint
inthesamedirection.Ifitstartsoutontheotherside,itwillmovefurther
awayinthatdirection.InthisChinesecasewefoundthatgroupsmoved
awayfromthemidpointonlyabouthalfthetimeandtheymovedtoward
themidpointabouthalfthetime.Hencetherewasnotendencyatallfor
theprocesstobedistortedbyapatternofgrouppolarization.Smallgroup
discussiondidnotdrivethegroupstowardmoreextremepositions.
Anotheraspirationofdeliberativedemocracyhasbeentheideathat
WhenthePeopleSpeak
wasconsultedaboutpolicyandthelocalleadershipappearedtohave
legitimacy,andatownnearbywhereithadnotdonesoandtherewere
Asecondpotentialbene“tisthatbythefourthprojectitseemedto
moreeffectivelyconnectaneliterepresentativeinstitution,theLocalPeo-
plesCongress,withamechanismofpublicwillformation.Eventhough
MakingDeliberationConsequential
accomplishedunderchallengingconditions.Nowweshouldlookmore
generallyatourfourquestions.
Theclaimofmicrocosmicdeliberationisthateverymemberofthepopu-
lationhas,ineffect,anequalrandomchanceofbeingselectedandonce
selected,anopportunityforhisorherviewstobeconsideredequally
withothers,before,during,andafterdeliberation.The“rstdif“cultywith
manyattemptstorealizethisideaisthatoftennodataarecollectedto
comparetheattitudesofthedeliberatorswiththosewhodonotdeliber-
ate.Oftenrepresentativenessisconsideredintermsofjustafewsimple
demographiccategories.Buthowcanamicrocosmpurporttorepresent
thepublicsconsideredjudgmentsattheendoftheprocessifwehave
WhenthePeopleSpeak
deliberation,aprocessmustbebinding.Ž
Tospecifybindingauthority
fordeliberativeprocesses„howeverconstituted„istoprovideanincen-
tiveforcaptureandformobilization.Attheleast,ithandsoversome
MakingDeliberationConsequential
Amorecredibleeffort,butonestillmarredbythelackofanydatafor
evaluatingattitudinalrepresentativenessontheissuestobediscussed,
occurredwiththenowfamousCitizensAssemblyinBritishColumbia.
TheGovernmentofBritishColumbiasponsoredacitizengrouptodelib-
erateoverthecourseofelevenmonthsaboutelectoralreform.Thedis-
tinctiveaspectoftheirchargewasthattheirproposalwouldgodirectly
ontheballotforareferendumbytheelectorateontheproposedreform.
Changeintheconstitutionrequireda60%supermajority.Asithappened,
theproposalgotamajoritybutfellshortofthe60%requirement.Wewill
WhenthePeopleSpeak
incentivesarepaidtoencouragerepresentativenessandparticipation
fromthosedrawninitiallyinthesampleandtomakeitpossiblefor
thoselessinterestedorlessfortunatetoparticipate.UnliketheCitizens
Assembly,attitudinalandotherdataarecollectedbeforethereisany
invitationsothatthereisabasisforevaluationoftheattitudinaland
demographicrepresentativeness.
To“xideasconsiderthepracticeofDeliberativePollstopayincentives.
The“rstDeliberativePoll,abouttheissueofcrimeinBritain,offereda
“nancialincentiveofamodest“ftyBritishpoundsinadditiontorailor
bustransportation,hotels,andmeals.TheNationalIssuesConvention
paideachparticipant$300asagestureofappreciation,plusfreeairfare,
hotels,andmeals.Inaddition,theseevents,likemostDeliberativePolls,
weretelevised.Someoftheparticipantswereundoubtedlyattractedby
theideaofparticipatinginanationalpublicdialogue.Butotherswere
attractedbytheincentiveorbytheideaofafreetriptoaninteresting
place.Specialeffortshadtobemadetofacilitateparticipationforthose
MakingDeliberationConsequential
suggestiveresultsand,likefocusgroups,revealqualitativedatathatcould
beuseful,iftheywerethensubjectedtomoresystematicinvestigation.
ACitizensJuryabouthealthcarereformatthetimeoftheClintonhealth
careproposalshowedmoresupportforaCanadiansingle-payerapproach.
Butwithsuchasmallsample,therewasnocrediblewaytogeneralize
theresultsandtheprojectsconclusionscouldonlyremainsuggestive.
WhenthePeopleSpeak
mostofthetimetomostcitizens.Mostcitizensbelievetheirviewswill
notmakeadifferenceandinanycase,theyaresubjectedtocontinuous
effortsintendedtodistract,manipulate,andoftendemobilizethem.
Asfordemandcharacteristics,itis“rstworthnotingthatevenifpar-
ticipantswishedtopleasetheorganizersbychangingtheirviews,they
wouldnotknowinwhatdirectiontodoso.Therewouldhavetobean
obviousimplicitagendaorhiddencurriculumofchange.Giventhework
thatadvisorygroupstypicallydotopreparebalancedbrie“ngmaterials
andpanelsofexpertsandpoliticiansorpolicymakers,thetransparency
andbalanceoftheprocessshouldservetoinsulateagainstthisdif“culty.
Second,inDeliberativePollsatleast,weemphasizeindiscussionswith
MakingDeliberationConsequential
WhenthePeopleSpeak
deliberativedemocracyinthesensede“nedhere.Deliberativedemocracy
asde“nedherehasthepunchlinethatitcombinesrepresentativenessof
thepopulation(viapoliticalequality)withdeliberation.Itisarepresenta-
tionofwhatthepublicwouldthink.Deliberationamongactivistgroups
couldinprinciplebestudiedorprovideconsultationifthepopulation
ofadvocateswerewellde“ned.Sothemembersofanadvocacygroup
couldbesampledrandomlyandthosesampledcoulddeliberate.But
theresultswouldrepresentonlythatrestrictedpopulation.Mostsuch
studiesofactivistdeliberationdonotbotherwithrandomsamplingbut
studythemodesofcommunicationamongthosewhogatherthemselves
MakingDeliberationConsequential
toasingleplacetodeliberateface-to-face.Notallthesamplesareperfect.
Oftentheyaresomewhatmoreeducatedormoreinterestedinpolitics
andpolicythanthegeneralpublic.Butwhentheseproblemsoccur,the
differences,whilestatisticallysigni“cant,areoftensubstantivelysmall.
Mostimportantly,thereisusuallyagreatdealofattitudinalrepresenta-
tivness.Inthatsensetheprojectsofferamicrocosmofthepopulations
argumentsandconcerns,amicrocosmreminiscentofMillsCongressof
WhenthePeopleSpeak
MakingDeliberationConsequential
WhenthePeopleSpeak
smallgroupandplenarysessionson-site,eventheinformalinteractions
MakingDeliberationConsequential
WhenthePeopleSpeak
aswellasmoreconventionalenergysources,andrepresentativesofthe
largecustomers.Inaddition,wewantedtheeventtobepublicand
transparent,includingtelevisioncoverageoftheweekendprocessto
therestoftheserviceterritoryandparticipationintheprocessfrom
thePublicUtilityCommissionerswhowouldanswerquestionsfromthe
IneightsuchDeliberativePollsinvariouspartsofTexasandnearby
Louisiana,thepublicwentforshrewdcombinationsofnaturalgas,
renewableenergy,andconservation.Averagingovereightprojects,the
percentagewillingtopaymoreonitsmonthlyutilitybilltosupport
renewableenergywentfrom52%84%.Thepercentagewillingtopay
moreforconservationwentfrom43%73%.TheresultingIntegrated
ResourcePlansallincludedsubstantialinvestmentsinrenewableenergy„
transformingTexasintothesecondleadingstateinwindpowerand
by2007theleadingstate,surpassingCalifornia.
Undoubtedly,many
oftheopinionsexpressedattheendreplacednon-attitudesorphan-
tomopinions.Butthepointisthattheopinionsexpressedintheend
weretheconsideredjudgmentsofrepresentativemicrocosms„-whatthe
publicwouldthinkundergoodconditionsandaftergreateffortsatbal-
anceandtransparencyhadbeenundertakentoguaranteethosegood
ThethirddefectinpublicopinionthattheDeliberativePollattempts
toaddressisthatevenwhencitizensdiscusspublicissues,theydiscuss
themoverwhelminglywiththelike-minded.Ordinarysocialconditions
dolittletofacilitatepeopletakingseriouslyargumentsfromopposing
pointsofview.OurexperienceintheDanishnationalDeliberativePoll
ontheEuro
MakingDeliberationConsequential
hadlearnedtheyesŽinformation.Randomlyassignedtosmallgroups
forface-to-facediscussion,peoplelearnedfromthosediscussionswhat
theyhadnotlearnedintheirhomeenvironments„-theinformation
supportingtheotherside.TheDeliberativePollcreatedasafepublicspace
wherepeoplecouldactuallytalkabouttheissuesonareasonedbasis,
despitetheirfundamentaldisagreementsonanissuesharplydividingthe
country.
WhenthePeopleSpeak
MakingDeliberationConsequential
:Theextenttowhichthemajorpositionsinthepublicare
representedbyparticipantsinthediscussion
:Theextenttowhichparticipantssincerelyweigh
themeritsofthearguments
Equalconsideration
:Theextenttowhichargumentsofferedbyall
participantsareconsideredonthemeritsregardlessofwhichpar-
ticipantsofferthem
Aswehavealreadyseen,informationquestionsestablishconsiderable
learninginthedeliberativeprocess.Wedonotrelyonself-reportsbut
ratheronquestionswithdemonstrablycorrectanswersandwithenough
optionssothatparticipantswillnotdowellbysimplyguessing(henceno
true/falsequestions).
TheDanishexperiencecitedaboveoffersanindicationofsubstantive
balance,inferablefromquestionnaireresponsesbeforeandafterdelib-
eration.Partisansofeachsideonthereferendumlearnedinformation
supportingtheothersideduringthesmallgroupdiscussions.Another
waytoapproachthisquestionwouldbetolookatthedeliberativeprocess
itself.AliceSiuhasopeneduptheblackboxofdeliberationbystudying
transcriptionsofrecordingsandthencodingtheargumentsofferedin
thesmallgroups.Basedon“veAmericanDeliberativePollswhichhad
WhenthePeopleSpeak
MakingDeliberationConsequential
Bothimplysomepredictablepatternofgroupprocessingthatwouldhold
regardlessofthemeritsoftheissues.Inthatsensebothwouldundermine
thenormativeclaimofdeliberation.Howcanwethinkthatpeopleare
decidingonthemeritsifsomepredictablepatternofgrouppsychology
WhenthePeopleSpeak
MakingDeliberationConsequential
Whilefurtherempiricalwork,includingadditionalexperimental
manipulations,willbenecessarytosortoutexactlywhy,itisalready
clearthatthereisnosubstantialpatternofinequalitiesdistortingthe
deliberativeprocessinthewaythatdeliberationcriticssuppose.First,itis
consistentlythecasethatchangeintheDPcannotbepredictedfrom
anyofthestandardsocioeconomicfactors,includingeducation,race,
gender,andincome.Thedegreeofchangeisnotcorrelatedwithanyof
thesefactors.However,intheoryonemightstillimaginetheadvantaged
dominatingbyturningthediscussionstotheiradvantage,butjustdoing
thatsoeffectivelythatsomehoweveryonechangesinthesameway,tothe
samedegree.Suchasuppositionwouldbehardtotakeseriously.However,
aswehaveseen,analysesofthedirectionofmovementtowardoraway
fromtheinitialpositionsoftheprivilegedalsorebuttheworrythatthey
Movementtoextremes?
ThepolarizationargumentputforwardvigorouslybyCassSunstein,
representsadifferentkindofdistortion.Sunsteinarguesthatthereisa
predictablepattern:groupdiscussionsleadtoextremes.Ifthereisanissue
forwhichthereisamidpoint,hislawofgrouppolarizationŽassertsthat,
ifthemeanpositionofthegroupbeginsononesideofthemidpoint,it
willmovefartheroutfromthemiddleinthesamedirection.Ifthemean
positionbeginsontheothersideofthemidpoint,itwillmovefartherout
fromthemiddleinthatdirection.
However,welookedatthedegreeofpolarizationin“fteenDeliberative
Pollswith1,848group/issuecombinations(thenumberofissueindicesin
agivenDPtimesthenumberofsmallgroupsinthatDPforall“fteenDPs).
Theproportionofsmallgroupsmovingawayfromthemidpointturns
outtobe50%.Inotherwords,theother50%ofthetime,themovement
wastowardthemidpointandsotherewasnotendencyatalltoward
polarizationinSunsteinssense.TheseDPstookplaceinvariouscountries,
includingtheUnitedStates(sixcases),Britain(“vecases),Bulgaria,China,
Greece,andAustralia.Allemployedscienti“crandomsamplesandface-
to-facediscussion.
Wedid“ndsomemodestevidence,notofpolarizationbutofhomoge-
nization.Therewasaslighttendencyofgroupstoconvergeinthesense
thatthevarianceinthegroupsdecreasedfor56%ofthegroup/issue
combinations.Ontheotherhand,thatmeantthat44%ofthetime
WhenthePeopleSpeak
opinionsinthegroupdivergedmoreafterdeliberation.Whilestatistically
signi“cant,theactualamountofmovementinthedirectionofhomo-
geneitywasmodest.
Inaddition,onemightnotethatthesubstanceof
thegroupthinkŽargumentisthatgroupswillconvergewithouthaving
reallyconsideredalternatives.Thatsocialconformitywillreplacethought
isthekeytothegroupthinkcritique.ButtheDPprocesshasmany
indicatorsthatthechangesarenotthoughtless,butrathertheresultof
MakingDeliberationConsequential
socialcomparisoneffect.Thereislesspressuretoconformtoamajority
positionbecausethemoderatorattemptstoensureeveryonesfreedomto
continueparticipatingwithouthavingtorevealwherethey“nallycome
outontheissue.
Asimilarpointcanbemadeaboutthemechanismsforgroupthink
whichprincipallyfocusongrouppressuresforconformityandlackof
diversityofviewpointsexpressed.Asmallcadreofdecision-makerstalking
toeachotheraboutforeignpolicymightsufferfromgroupthinkbecause
theyhaveonlyatruncatedargumentpoolandpressuretocometocon-
sensus.Butwithrandomandrepresentativesamplesofthepublicanda
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Changesinpolicyattitudes
ThepunchlineofaDeliberativePollisachangeinpolicyattitudes,
achangeinanswerstothequestion:whatistobedone?Westudied
“fty-eightindicesofpolicyattitudesinninenationalDeliberativePolls
MakingDeliberationConsequential
maycorrespondwiththeviewsinconventionalpolls,onecanneverbe
sure,unlesstheyhavebeentestedbyadversearguments,unlesstheyhave
beentestedbyseriousdeliberationaboutpolicyalternatives.
Changesinvotingintention
Asnotedearlier,itiswidelyestablishedthatvotershavelowlevelsof
information.Somearguehoweverthattheyhavemorethanenough
informationtomakethesimplevotingdecisionstheyarecalledonto
makeinmoderndemocracies.AsSamPopkinputsitfamously,low
informationrationalityŽcanapproximatehighinformationrationalityŽ
throughtheuseofheuristics.OrasArthurLupiatermsit,shortcutsŽcan
approximateencyclopedicknowledge.Ž
Votersneednotbecomemas-
sivelyinformedbecausetheycandrawinferencesfrombitsofknowledge
WhenthePeopleSpeak
indirectmodelwouldprovecrucial.Thedirectelectionistshadtodecide
MakingDeliberationConsequential
didnottakeintoaccountconsiderationsabouthowanelectedpresident
wouldrelatetothePrimeMinister.Andifthepublicwantedtokeepthe
restofthesystemintact,thenonfurtherthoughttheymovedinthesame
wayastheeliteconventionhad.
Fromthestandpointofourdemocratictheories,afundamentalques-
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Conservatives,wholosttheactualelection,decreasedtheirsharefrom
29%to21%.
AsinotherDPstheparticipantsbecamemoreinformedaboutthe
issues,bothwhenmeasuredbymultiplechoicequestionsandwhenmea-
suredbyquestionsaskingrespondentstoplacethepartiesonissuescales.
Onfactualknowledgethepercentageansweringcorrectlywentfrom47%
to61%andonthepartyplacementsthecorrectanswerswentupfrom
41%to48%.
Therespondentswereaskedtoplacethemselvesonthesameissuescales
astheyplacedtheparties,affordingapossiblewindowontovotechoice.
Therewerefourissuescales„onincomeredistribution,taxesandspend-
ing,minimumwage,andonfullunitywiththeEU.Participantsmoved
closesttotheLiberalDemocratsontheissuesoverallatthesametime
thattheirvotesfortheLibDemsincreaseddramatically.Theyalsomoved
closertoLabour,butlessso.Insum,theparticipantsbecamedemon-
strablymoreinformedanddramaticallychangedtheirvotingchoicesin
waysthatcoherentlyrelatedtotheirmoreinformedpolicyviewsofthe
AnothernationalDP,in1999inDenmarkbeforethereferendumonthe
Euro,alsoshowssigni“cantopinionchange.Anationalsampleof364was
gatheredinOdenseattheUniversityofSouthernDenmarkindialogue
MakingDeliberationConsequential
WhenthePeopleSpeak
informationlevelsofparticipants,changesthatareroutineineveryDP.
Measuringtrueinformationgainisacomplexissuesinceifthequestions
MakingDeliberationConsequential
showsubstantialinformationgainsanditisgenerallythosewhogain
informationwhodrivetheattitudechange.
WhenthePeopleSpeak
[h]eiscalledupon,whilesoengaged,toweighinterestsnothisown;to
beguidedincaseofcon”ictingclaims,byanotherrulethanhisprivate
partialities;toapply,ateveryturn,principlesandmaximswhichhavefor
theirreasonofexistencethegeneralgood....Heismadetofeelhimselfone
ofthepublicandwhateverisintheirinteresttobehisinterest.
MillcalledformoreschoolsofpublicspiritŽandexperimentationwith
theirdesign.InasensetheDP,likeothermicrocosmicdeliberationsis
MakingDeliberationConsequential
engageinmoreconventionalformsofpoliticalparticipation.Andwedo
haveindicationsthatonceactivatedtheyaremorelikelytoparticipate.
IntheNationalIssuesConvention,anationalDPheldinAustin,Texas,
indialoguewithpresidentialcandidates,therespondentswereasked
abouttheirparticipationon“rstcontact(T1),attheendoftheweekend
(T2),andthentenmonthslater(T3).Tenmonthslater,thereweresig-
ni“cantincreasesinhowoftenrespondentstalkedaboutpolitics(byself-
WhenthePeopleSpeak
democraticchoice.First,itmeansthatindividuallyrationalpreferences
mayleadtocollectivelyirrationalresults.Second,itmeansthatcollective
decisionsmaybeunstable,inthatmajoritiescansuccessivelyundoeach
other.Third,itmeansthattheresultsofdemocraticdecisionmaydepend
onthearbitrarinessofagendamanipulation.Inasituationwithcycles,
anyofseveralalternativesmayhavemajoritysupportandsotheagenda
MakingDeliberationConsequential
theyshouldgo,butitmightstillbethecasethateachpersonsviewscan
beaccuratelydescribedasanorderingonthatshareddimension.
AnumberofDPsemployedrankingquestionspermittingustoinvesti-
gatethepossibilityofcycles.WelookedatsixDPsfromTexaswithrank-
ingquestionsaboutenergychoices.Participantswereaskedtorank:(1)
WhenthePeopleSpeak
andsecond,thatitwouldincreasethemostamongthosewhobecame
themostwellinformed.Wedidnothavethedatatoexaminethe“rst
constraintdirectly,butproxieditwiththedegreeofsalience,reasoning
thatifanissuewerehighlysalient,thenthepublichadalreadycometo
somejudgment,atleastcomparedwithissuesoflowsalience.
Thishypothesiswasresoundinglycon“rmedbyourcases.Deliberation
consistentlyincreasedproximitytosingle-peakedness,butitdidsomore
inthelesssalientcases(theelectricutilityenergychoicesandregionaltax
sharingcases,forexample,withthelowestsalience,theelectricitygoals
withmoderatesalience)anditdidsomoreamongthosewhobecamewell
informedineveryDP.Deliberationcreatesasharedunderstandingofwhat
isatstakeinpolicytrade-offs.Deliberatorsneednotagreeonthesolution,
onlyonwhattheyaredisagreeing„oragreeing„about.
Theresulthas
implicationsforourcon“denceinthecollectivemeaningfulnessofthe
publicwill.Withhighproximitytosingle-peakednesswecanbecon“dent
thatindividuallyrationalpreferenceswillnotproducecollectivelyirra-
tionalresults.Wecanbecon“dentthatarbitraryagendamanipulations
MakingDeliberationConsequential
voicesinadialogueortheconclusionsfromit,thatcanincreasethe
motivationforpeopletotakepartandtotakeitseriously.
MostDPsapartfromthoseinChinaandThailandhavereceivedsub-
stantialtelevisioncoverage.Oftentherearebroadcastpartners.Someof
thesemediapartnershaveincludedPBS(the
BythePeople
initiativeof
MacNeil/LehrerProductions),ChannelFourinBritain,theBBC,Danish
Broadcasting,BulgarianNationalTelevision,NHK(Japan),theAustralian
BroadcastingCorporation,theCanadianBroadcastingCorporation,Arte
WhenthePeopleSpeak
WhenthispollwithahumanfaceŽisbroadcastandcoveredinthe
pressitgivesvoicenotonlytotherepresentativeviewsofthepublic,but
toitsconsideredjudgments.Bydoingso,itcanaffecttheagendaand
perhapsprimeissuesthatarealsoofgreatestconcern,onre”ection,to
themicrocosm.Becausethegatheringisrepresentative,thoseconcerns
MakingDeliberationConsequential
JayRosen,aninventorofpublicjournalism,Žheldaseminaron-site
withtwenty-fourjournalistswhohadjustcoveredtheNationalIssues
WhenthePeopleSpeak
viewersinChicago,someofwhomwererandomlypromptedtowatch
thebroadcast.Therewasasurprisinglystrongeffectontheviewers,in
MakingDeliberationConsequential
thepeople,theywerereluctanttocutthenumberofhospitalbeds.The
factthatRomehadsomanymorethananyotherpartofItalywasapoint
ofprideandverypopular.
OnDecember3,2006,arandomsampleof119votersintheRegione
wasgatheredtoastategovernmentbuildinginRomeforadaysdelibera-
tions.Thedeliberatorswereattitudinallyrepresentativebutslightlyolder
andmoreeducatedthanthenonparticipants.
Themostnotableresult
wasthatthepercentagebelievingtheRegioneshouldconvertsomeofits
bedsintootherresourcesthatmakethestructuresmoreef“cientŽwent
from45%beforedeliberationto62%afterward.Supportforconverting
someofthehospitalbedsspeci“callyintopoly-ambulatoryfacilities
whereyoucangoforsomechecksthatnowyoucanreceiveonlythrough
hospitalizationŽchangedonlyslightly,butwasveryhighbothbeforeand
after„87%beforeand85%afterdeliberation.
AftertheDP,thestategovernmentmovedtoimplementaplanto
WhenthePeopleSpeak
favorablyinpressreleasesbytheutilitycompaniesandtheEnvironmen-
talDefenseFundonthesameday.
MakingDeliberationConsequential
(mostlyfrom$1to$5amonth).Therewasalsoapreferenceforthecostto
besharedbyallusers.Thiswasasigni“cantunderpinningforthedecisions
WhenthePeopleSpeak
andsecuringthelowestprice.Theimportanceoftheeconomicfactors
wasstrongpredeliberation,butaftertheeventitdroppedbyhalf.The
environmentalconsiderationssuchascontributingtothecontrolofemis-
sionsandtotheglobalefforttodealwithclimatechangewenttothe
top.AftertheDPthecompanyproceededwithmajornewinvestmentsin
renewableenergy
MakingDeliberationConsequential
thelocalprojectswerenotwidelycoveredinthebroadcastorprint
WhenthePeopleSpeak
discussing„DeliberativeDemocracybythepeoplethemselvesandElite
Deliberationbyanelectedbody.
OurownAmericanjourneyofinstitutionaldesignbeganwithafocus
onindirect“ltration,onrepresentativesre“ningandenlargingthepub-
licviewsŽinarelativelysmallbodylikeaconventionortheSenate.
ButfortheEliteDeliberationtheorytherewasalwaysthequestionof
howthosediscussionsmightconnectwiththepeople,since,exceptfor
extraordinarytimesofconstitutionalchange,thepeopleweremostlynot
deliberatingthemselves.InMadisonsterms,howdotherepresentatives
MakingDeliberationConsequential
connectiontodecision„advisory(invaryingdegreesandcontexts)and
formalauthority„-areworthexperimentingwithtomakethethoughtful
andrepresentativevoiceofthepublicconsequential.
Supposedeliberativemicrocosmsweretobecomeinstitutionalized?
Howmightthisoccurandwouldtherebeadangerthat,onceinstitu-
tionalized,theprocesscouldbevictimizedbyitsownsuccess?Isntthere
aproblemthatthemoreimportantthedecisions,themorelikelythe
processbecomesvulnerabletocaptureand/orcorruption?
Firsttherationaleforthekindofresearchprogramdescribedhereis
toexploretheviabilityofapplyingdeliberativemicrocosmstothepolicy
process.Theideaistoassessthedesignsthatbeststanduptocritical
scrutinysoastocapturethepromiseofdeliberationandavoidpoten-
tialobjectionstoit.Butalltheseapplicationshavebeenepisodic.They
havebeenbasedonparticularopportunitiesprovidingentrypointsfor
theprocess.Oneidealmodelforinstitutionalizationissuggestedbythe
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Transparencyisoneprotection.Anotherprotectioncomesfromthe
design.IntheGreekDP,adisgruntledcandidatewhodidnotmakethe
shortlisttriedtointerferewiththeprocessbyhiringacallcentertotell
participantsthattheeventwascancelled.Butthecallcenterhadnoway
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
Pushingtheboundariesofpublicconsultation
Theeffortsindeliberativedemocracywehavediscussedsofarhavetaken
placemostlywithinthefavorableconditionsofnormalpoliticsŽin
establishedliberaldemocracies.
Butitisworthconsideringawiderrange
ofconditionstoapplytheconcept.Therearetwobasiccomponentsto
deliberativedemocracythathavetoberealized:inclusionandthoughtful-
ness.Howcanweincludeeveryone,oratleastamicrocosmofeveryone,
andhowcanweestablishconditionsfortheircollectivethoughtfulness,
foracredibledeliberativeprocess?
Wehavealreadydiscussedoneobviouscasethatpushesboundaries,
deliberatingoutsideestablisheddemocracies.Aswesaw,thelocalChinese
projectsdowellonourproposedcriteria.Intermsofrecruitment,the
legaciesofauthoritarianismmayevenhavemaderecruitmentofthose
drawninthesampleeasier.Intermsofdeliberativequality,theyalsodid
wellontheaspectswecouldmeasure„thechangesdrivenbyinformation
gain,thebalancedmaterials,discussionsthatarenotdistortedbyeither
inequalityorpolarization,participantswhobecomemorepublic-spirited.
Inaddition,theresultshaveactuallybeenimplemented.Itdoesnot
WhenthePeopleSpeak
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
Whiledispositionscanbeincentivized,theycannotbelegislatedby“at
orspeci“edbyaninstitutionaldesign.Andthedispositionspeoplebring
withthemintothediscussionsarepartofthebackgroundconditionsfor
anyproject.Fortheprocesstowork,participantsmustbe
sincerelyweighingtheargumentsontheirmerits.Hence,severedivi-
WhenthePeopleSpeak
ofawidenationaldiscussion.A1999referendumproposedthattheCon-
stitutionaddapreambleacknowledgingtheroleofindigenouspeoplesin
Australianhistory.However,thisreferendumpropositionwasdefeated.
TherewerealsowidespreadrevelationsaboutthestolengenerationŽ
ofAboriginalswhohadbeentakenfromtheirparentsandplacedin
institutionsfrom1869untilasrecentlyasthe1970s.Atleast100,000
childrenweresubjectedtothisforcedremovalovertheyears.Courtshad
refusedcompensationtothevictimsfocusingpublicdiscussiononthe
plightoftheentireAboriginalcommunity.
Inthiscontext,adistinguishedadvisoryboardfortheDeliberativePoll
approvedbrie“ngdocumentscoveringthehistoricalbackgroundtothe
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
allthegroupsmovedinthesamedirection,inadirectiontowardgreater
reconciliationandsupportfortheAboriginalsandotherindigenouspeo-
ple.Butthegroupsthathadsuchmembersinthemmovedmoreinthat
direction,indicatingtheimportanceofwhoisintheroom.Ofcourse,
WhenthePeopleSpeak
whoareidenti“edasRoma
inapopulationofmorethan7million.
Withcloseto10%ofthepopulation,agoodsamplecouldbringthe
Romaintothesmallgroupdiscussionswithouthavingtograpplewith
theoversampleproblemthatwefacedinAustraliawiththeAboriginals.
TheRomaliveinalargelyseparatecommunityindireconditions.
whothoughtthattheRomashouldliveinseparateRomaneighbor-
hoods,Ždeclinedfrom43%to21%whilethosewhothoughtthegov-
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Inallthreepolicyareas,themovementwasgenerallyinthedirection
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
Protestantbackground).Onallothersocio-demographics,thepartici-
pantsandnonparticipantswereverysimilar.Forexample,theproportions
ofsingleversusmarriedpeople,ofthosehavingauniversitydegreeor
postgraduatequali“cation,wereaboutthesameforintervieweeswho
attendedthedeliberationsandthosewhodidnot.Theparticipantsand
nonparticpantsalsoaveragedaboutthesamenumberofchildren.
WhenthePeopleSpeak
dramaticallymoreknowledgeable.Theoverallknowledgeindexincreased
bythirtypointsandsomequestionsshowedgainsofmorethan“fty
points.TheprojectreceivedahalfhourofcoverageontheBBCandwas
widelydiscussedandwellreceivedinthepolicycommunity.
Theseresultssuggestaconstructiveanswertoafundamentalquestion:
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
withsuchviewsofeachothereveniftheydidnotstartitwiththem.That
isthemessagethatseemstobedemonstratedinthisNorthernIreland
experiment.ThelevelsofagreementwiththepropositionthatCatholics
orProtestantsaretrustworthyŽoropentoreasonŽrosedramatically
followingdeliberation.Thepolicyoptionschartedawayforwardfor
educationinasharedfuturerespectingtheinterestsofchildreninboth
communities.Thepubliccanengageinaconstructivewayevenwhen
thereisalegacyofviolentcon”ictandmutualsuspicion.
Virtualdemocracy
Wehavefocusedsofaronface-to-facedeliberation.Gatheringascienti“c
microcosmphysicallytoasingleplacerequiresresourcesfortransporta-
tion,hotels,food,andallthelogisticsofasmallconvention.The1996
NationalIssuesConventioninAustin,Texas,hadAmericanAirlinesasthe
of“cialairlineyieldingsomesigni“canttransportationsavings.Asimilar
WhenthePeopleSpeak
ofcommunication,byusingvoiceratherthantext,withspecialsoftware
thatwouldallowmoderatorstoconvenesmallgroupdiscussionsona
weeklybasis.Afterseveralweeks,theparticipantstookthesameques-
tionnaireasatthebeginning.Thechangesinopinionwouldrepresentthe
consideredjudgmentsofthedeliberativemicrocosmandapre-andpost-
controlgroupwhodidnotdeliberatecouldbeeasilyincluded.Thisbasic
designhasbeenemployedseveraltimes,withtheinnovationthatsome
oftheprojectshaveusedrecruitmentwithmatchingcharacteristicsfrom
alargeonlinepanelofmorethanamillion,withrandomassignmentto
treatmentandcontrol,thussavingtheexpenseofbuyingcomputers.
The“rstonlineDeliberativePollwasconductedin2003inparallel
withaface-to-faceDPonthesametopic„Americanforeignpolicy.In
theonlineproject,atreatmentsampleof280deliberatorssuppliedby
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
theonlinerespondentswereimmersedintheirnormalenvironmentsthe
WhenthePeopleSpeak
thedeliberatorspolicybecameanimportantfactor,aboutasimportantas
electability.Candidatetraitswerestillthemostimportantbutatleastthe
deliberatorsseriouslyweighedhowclosethecandidatesproposedpolicies
weretotheirownpreferences.
InasecondonlineDPinthe2004presidentialelection,theprocesswas
appliedtocandidatechoiceinthegeneralelection.Herepolicypositions
againbecameimportantforcandidatechoice,butinthiscasedeliberation
bothincreasedtheroleofpolicyanddecreasedtheroleofpersonality
orcandidatetraits.Ofcourse,inageneralelectionpolicydifferencesare
greateramongthecandidatesthaninaprimary,butinbothcasesthe
increasedroleofpolicypositionsisreassuringaboutthepossibilitythat
ordinarycitizensarecapableofbecomingdeliberativevoters.
AnothernationalonlineDeliberativePollfocusedonpossiblepolitical
reformsontheeveofthe2008primaryseason.SponsoredbytheColonial
WilliamsburgFoundationwithmediapartnerMacNeil/LehrerProduc-
tions,theonlineDPengaged301deliberatorsinfourone-hoursessions
withacontrolgroupof1,000.
Thediscussionsfocusedonfouraspects
oftheroleofcitizensinademocracy:politicalparticipation,exercising
choice,becominginformed,andpublicservice.Ineachcase,therewere
argumentsforandagainsttheimportanceofthebasicgoalandspeci“c
policyproposalsthatmightachieveit.
Onallfourtopicstherewerestatisticallysigni“cantchangesofopinion
andlargegainsininformation.Thesamplelearnedalotandchangedits
views.Infact,thirty-nineoutof“fty-sixpolicyquestions(66%)changed
signi“cantlyamongthedeliberatorsfromthebeginningtotheendofthe
Theprojectwasnotablebecauseitappliedtherelativelymodest
interventionofonlinediscussionforanhouraweektobasicquestions
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
from58%to49%.Manyoftherespondentsnotedinthediscussionsthat
WhenthePeopleSpeak
to71%.Therewasalsoabeliefthatpoliticalcandidatesshouldfocus
moreonpolicyissuesintheircampaignsŽ(thoseagreeingincreased
from88%to97%)andcomparablyhighagreementthatpoliticalcan-
didatesnowfocustoomuchonattackingothercandidatesintheir
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
supportchangingtheElectoralCollegetoincreasechoicebutoppose
termlimits.Theywouldsupportexpandingpublicserviceprogramsbut
opposemakingthemcompulsory.Whilethechangeswerenumerousand
signi“cant,fourhoursoverfourweekshardlyexhauststhepotentialfor
adaptingmicrocosmicdeliberationtoavirtualenvironment.Wemight
imagineonlinedeliberationsthatcontinueformonthsratherthanweeks,
capitalizingonthelogisticaladvantagethatpeoplecanparticipatefrom
theirhomeswithoutanyneedtotraveltoasinglesite.Puttingthe
nationinavirtualroomcouldcontinueformonthsorevenyears.Under
thesescenariositwouldbehastytoconcludethatonlineDPs,whichcut
thecostofanationalconsultationbyupto90%,arenecessarilymore
modestintheirresultsthanface-to-faceprojects.Itisquitepossiblethat
technologymayfacilitatethefrequencyandscopeofrepresentativeand
informedversionsofdeliberativedemocracy.Our“rstprojectsareonly
thebeginningofthenascenteffortstoadaptthissortofapproachtoan
onlineenvironment.
TheproblemofaEuropean-widepublicsphere
TheproblemofdemocraticconsultationintheEuropeanUnionembodies
allthechallengeswehavebeendiscussinguptonow,plussomeaddi-
tionalones.Tobeginwith,thereisthewidelyperceiveddemocratic
de“citŽinwhichthepolicyelitesarethoughttobeinsularfromthe
wishesofthepublic.ButwhatpublicŽ?Therearetwenty-sevenmember
statesandeachhasitsownpoliticalsystemanditsownpublicdiscussion.
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Consideranotherproblem.Intermsofdemocratictheory,thedevelop-
mentoftheEuropeanUnionseemscaughtinafundamentalandrecur-
ringdilemma,atransnationalversionofthedilemmawesawrecurringon
amoremodestscaleincandidateselectionandpolicychoice.Consulting
thepeopledirectly,withlowlevelsofinformation,leadstoathin,plebisc-
itaryformofpolitics.Butconsultingonlyelitesseemsundemocraticand
divorcedfromtheconcernsofthepeople.IntheGreekDPwesawhow
anationalpoliticalpartyfacedthisissueincandidateselection.TheDP
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
Inthelocal,regional,andnationaldeliberativeeffortswehavedis-
cussedthusfar,therehasbeenanimportantbackgroundcondition„the
existence,atleasttosomedegree,ofapublicsphereŽ„asharedpublic
spacewherepublicopinioncantakeshapeandcontributetocollective
willformation.Twobasicquestionsapplytosuchapublicsphere„
credible
isthepublicopinionthattakesshapewithinitandhow
isthatopinion?Credibilitycanbeassessedintermsthatwe
discussedearlier.Isitthoughtful?Isitinformed?Isitsubjecttodistortions
WhenthePeopleSpeak
encompassedinabroaderdialoguewheretheperceivedzero-sumnature
oftheirlocaldiscussionsmaynotapply?
Athirdchallengeappliestotheverypossibilityofcommunication,of
mutualintelligibility.Therearetwenty-threeof“ciallanguagesintheEU.
Language,aswehaveseen,isagreatbarriertoasharedpublicsphere.
AmicrocosmicversionofaEuropeanwidepublicsphere,ifitwerereally
representativeofthepeople,wouldhavetousetechnologytoovercome
thebarriersoflinguisticdivision.Inthisrespect,anEU-wideeffortisabit
likethedeliberativeprojectsinvirtualspace.Atechnology„inthiscase
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
TheconcernsofNorthernEurope,withitshighlydevelopedwelfare
states,wouldnotintersectwiththoseofSouthernEuropewherethepen-
sionandsocialwelfareprovisionsarefarlesselaborate.Therewouldbea
seriesofenclavedeliberationsŽperhaps“lledwithmisinformationabout
thefactsapplyingtoothercountriesorthosewho“tcertaincountry
Apublicsphereisadeliberativecommunicativesystem.Butisitneces-
sary?Onsomeofthetheoriesofdemocracywehavediscussed,itisnot.
Theaspirationforcollectivewillformationisnotsharedamongallvisions
WhenthePeopleSpeak
whattheythinkthepublicwouldwantonre”ection,orperhapsjustwhat
theeliteswant,onre”ection.Theyre“neandenlargethepublicviewsŽ
butbypassingthemthroughelectedrepresentativesasthechosenbody
ofcitizens.ŽDeliberationbythemasspublicisnottobeexpectedand
couldevenbedangerous.Hence,theaspirationforcitizendeliberation
isonsomeviewsutopianormisguidedorirresponsible.Itisnot,byany
means,sharedamongalltheoriesofdemocracy.
ThataspirationisparticularlychallengedinaEuropean-widecontext.
IntheEU,somecommentatorsbelievethemostthatcouldbesoughtisa
seriesofmoredevelopedpublicspheressegmentedatthenationallevel.
ButasNancyFraserhaspointedout,suchastrategywouldtrytolimitthe
applicationofthepublicsphere,essentialforcollectivewillformation,
intoanincreasinglyoutmodedWestphalianŽsystemofseparatenation-
states„nation-stateswhoseboundariesnolongercomprisetheeffective
boundariesofdecisionsortheireffects,politicallyoreconomically,or
inre”ectingthemovementsofworkers,andgoodsandcommunication
processesinanincreasinglymobileworldofpeopleandideas.Somehow
theEuropeanideaneedstobeadaptedtoatransnationalpublicsphereif
democracyistobemeaningful.
Fraseroutlinessixareaswheretheideaofthepublicsphere,conceived
atthenationallevel,requiresseriousrevisionintheincreasinglycommon
transnationalcontext.TheEuropeanUnionembodiesasegmentationin
thesesixareastoahighdegree.TheoriginalHabermasiannotionof
thepublicspherewherepublicopinioncouldbe“lteredforcollective
willformationfordecisionswasconceivedforapplicationwithinagiven
nation-state.WhileHabermashasadmittedthedif“cultiesofapplying
thenotioninatransnationalcontext,thosedif“cultiesonlyreinforcethe
urgencyofinstitutionalexperimentationtoaddresstheproblemsonhis
view.Otherwise,theencroachingpowersoftheEUonitsnation-state
membersfurtherincreasethedemocraticde“citbecausethosepowers
areexercisedwithoutdemocraticlegitimation.IftheEUwerelefttobe
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
WhenthePeopleSpeak
apublicspheretosupportandprovideinputtotheirdecisionscripples
theMadisonianEliteDeliberationmodel.Howcanrepresentativesre“ne
andenlargethepublicsviewswhensomanypublicsarehardlyeven
awareofeachotherandtherearenotevenhintsatthemasslevelofhow
thepublicwouldapproachtheviewpointsexpressedbytheelitesfrom
differentcountriesindifferentlanguagesandwithdifferentconcerns?
Elites,evenwhentheyconscientiouslydeliberateonthemerits,mayonly
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
CansuchamodelworktobringintobeingtheEuropeanpublicsphere,
ifonlyonamicrocosmiclevel?Millsmodelwasproposedforalegislature
WhenthePeopleSpeak
possibletocompareparticipantsandnonparticipantsinbothattitudes
anddemographics.
Beforetheprojectbeganwefacedaconceptualproblem:wasthisa
sampleoftwenty-sevenpopulationsorasampleofonepopulation,a
sampleoftwenty-sevencountriesorofEuropeasawhole?Ifitwere
asampleoftwenty-sevenpopulations,twenty-sevendistinctcountries,
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
WhenthePeopleSpeak
wentfrom55%to45%,supportforadmittingUkrainefellbyevenmore,
from69%to55%.Bytheendofthedeliberations,theTurkeyissuewas
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
theoldmemberstateparticipantschangedhardlyatall(from60.6%to
58.5%).OnthequestionofadmittingTurkey,theparticipantsfromnew
memberstateswentfrom57%to42%,adropof“fteenpoints,while
theparticipantsfromtheoldmemberstatesdroppedonlyfrom54%to
47%.OnUkraine,thedecline(andthecontrast)wasevenmoredramatic.
Theparticipantsfromnewmemberstateswhosupportedadmissionwent
from78%to50%adramaticdeclineoftwenty-eightpoints.Bycontrast
theparticipantsfromtheoldmemberstatesdeclinedinsupportonlyfrom
66%to58%.
WhenthePeopleSpeak
againof16%.Theparticipantsfromtheoldmemberstatesansweredan
averageof40%oftheknowledgequestionscorrectlybeforedeliberating
and56%ofthemcorrectlyafterdeliberating,anidenticalgainof16%.
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
Afterdeliberation,participantscametoseethemselvesmoreasEuro-
peans,ratherthanjustcitizensoftheirowncountries.Overall,theper-
centageviewingthemselvesasEuropeansincreasedfrom77%to85%,
withanespeciallybigincreasefromthenewmemberstates(increasing
from69%to87%).Butthismovetowardself-identi“cationattheEuro-
peanleveldidnotaccompanyanyincreasedsensethatdecisionsneeded
tobemadeattheEuropeanlevel.Inonepolicyareaafteranother,taxa-
tion,socialpolicy,foreignpolicy,defense,onlyaminority(rangingfrom
ahighof40%toalowof25%)endedupsupportingEU-leveldecision-
makingbasedonalargemajorityratherthanunanimousagreementor
decisionsrelegatedprimarilytothenation-statelevel.Identi“cationwith
EuropedidnotproduceincreasedsupportforEuropean-leveldecision-
makingbindingontheindividualmemberstates.Anincreasedidenti“ca-
WhenthePeopleSpeak
dif“cultiesposedbydeliberationinvirtualspaceandthetransnational
challengeofaEuropeanpublicsphere.
Inallthesecases,thefocushasbeenonimplementingtwoofourcore
principlessimultaneously„politicalequalityanddeliberation.Butthe
third,massparticipation,hasremainedanaspiration,notdirectlymuch
affectedbytheeffort.Totheextentwearesubjecttothetrilemma,we
willfacechoicesaboutwhichcoredemocraticprinciplestoimplement
forwhatpurposes.
Democraticidealsmustbeconsideredintheplural.MoredemocracyŽ
doesnotmeananyonething.Itcouldmeanincreasingtheopportunities
formassparticipationthroughmorereferenda,primaries,orotherforms
ofdirectconsultation.Oritcouldmeanimprovingthedegreetowhich
thevotesorpreferencesofeveryoneareconsideredequallythroughredis-
trictingorequalizingthetechnologyofvotingorothersuchreforms,orit
couldmeanincreasingtheextentofvoterinformationanddeliberation.
Inotherwords,itcanmeanmoreparticipation,ormorepoliticalequality,
ormoredeliberation.Butwehavefoundwiththetrilemmathatthese
valuesareincon”ictwhenpursuedinanyreallyambitiousmanner.
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
WhenthePeopleSpeak
thatisdistinctlydifferentfromotherareasofpoliticaltheorysuchasthe
theoryofjustice?Infact,Ihavearguedthatthesamesituationapplies
todistributivejustice.
Aparalleltrilemmaapplies,forexample,tothe
problemofequalopportunity,akeycomponentofanytheoryofdistrib-
utivejustice.Noadequatetheoryofjusticecandowithoutprinciplesthat
specifyhowpeopleareassignedtopositionsinthesocialstructure:what
opportunitiesdotheyhave?
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
toreplicatethemselves.Parentsacttobene“ttheirchildrenbygiving
WhenthePeopleSpeak
childrenandatwofoldequalityclaim„aformalclaimaboutequalcon-
siderationandasubstantiveclaimaboutthelikelihoodofequaloutcomes
forrelevantlysimilarcases.
Inourdemocratictheorycase,theformalclaimispoliticalequality
requiringequalconsiderationofonesviewsorconsideredjudgments.The
libertyclaimsconcernthelibertytoformopinions(deliberation)andthe
libertytoparticipate.Aswesawearlier,underrealisticconditionswecan
fullyachieveonlytwooutofthree.Wehavecon”ictingidealsbutno
singleidealthatdrivesusinanunambiguousdirectionforreform„ifthe
goalistoful“llallthreesimultaneously.
Ofcourse,wecanenvisionwhatauni“edidealwithallthreemightbe
like.Wecanevenimagineaplausiblescenariowithatransformational
effortlikeDeliberationDay,whichmightsimultaneouslyrealizeallthree
toasigni“cantdegreeforatleastalimitedperiodoftime„adaywhich
precedestheelection.Butthesplintereddirectionalityofwherewego
fromheremarkstheproblemcharacteristicof
idealswithoutanideal
Unlesswecansummonthepoliticalwilltomakeprogressonallthree
DeliberatingUnderDif“cultConditions
tothesetrilemmas.Supposethattherewereanindisputableanduni“ed
idealsolutiontotheproblemsofdemocracyandjustice,approachable
WhenthePeopleSpeak
WhyWeNeedOnlyFourDemocraticTheories
InChapter2weconsideredfourprinciplesthatcombineintofourrecognizable
Participatory
Politicalequality
Ifthesearethefourkeyprinciples,onemightaskwhytherearejustfourpossibil-
itiesandnotsixteen.Asamatteroflogictherearesixteenpossiblecombinations
WhenthePeopleSpeak
ChartVII.
Sixteenpossiblepositions
Politicalequality
Fourofthesearenon-agnosticversionsofourproposedfour.Theyembracethe
twoprinciplesthatde“nethepositioninmyviewandinsteadofbeingambiguous
abouttheothertwoprinciples(symbolizedbythequestionmarksinthe“rstchart)
theyrejecttheothertwo.FromthatperspectivePosition2isourParticipatory
Democracy(de“nedbythecombinationofparticipationandpoliticalequality),
Position3isourEliteDeliberation(de“nedbythecombinationofdeliberation
WhenthePeopleSpeak
Position13iscommittedjusttopoliticalequalitybutrejectsparticipation,delib-
eration,andnon-tyranny.Aswehaveseen,politicalequalitycanbecombined
withotherprinciples,sowhystopatonlyoneandrejecttheotherthree?This
Chapter1
1.Foranowclassicaccountofhownewtechnologiescanbedeployedto
mobilizedemonstrationsseeHowardReingold(2002),
SmartMobs:The
NextSocialRevolution
,NewYork:BasicBooks.
2.SeetheargumentofLawrenceR.JacobsandRobertY.Shapiro(2000),
PoliticiansDontPander:PoliticalManipulationandtheLossofDemocratic
,Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.
ParticipatoryDemocracy
,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.One
couldarguethatbareexposureisnotdeliberationandthatrealdelib-
erationmayenhancefutureparticipation,aswe“ndbelow.
8.JohnStuartMill(1869),
OnLiberty
,London:Longman.Foranaccountof
howMillsnotionofindividualityŽamountstoatheoryofautonomyŽ
seeJohnGray(1983),
MillOnLiberty:ADefence
,London:Routledge.
Foranargumentthatweareexercisingfreedomofassociationtoclus-
terwiththelike-mindedseeBillBishop(2008),
TheBigSort:Whythe
ClusteringofLike-MindedAmericaisTearingusApart
,NewYork:Houghton
18.WehaveexperimentedwithciviceducationmodeledontheDelibera-
RobertC.Luskin,andmyself.WearegratefultoGeorgePapandreoufor
hisvisionandsupport.
26.GeorgeA.Papandreou(2006),PickingcandidatesbythenumbersŽin
InternationalHeraldTribune
,June7.Availableat
27.JohnLloyd(2006),ThePericleanPrimaryŽin
LaRepubblica
,October6
(translationmadeavailablebytheauthor).Availableat
35.SeeI.F.Stone(1989),
TheTrialofSocrates
,NewYork:AnchorBooks.
36.ForastimulatingoverviewseeBernardManin(1996),
ThePrinci-
plesofRepresentativeGovernment
,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
37.The”oweringofinterestindeliberativedemocracyisremarkable.For
someindicationsofthebreadthofthedialogueseeeditedvolumessuch
asJamesBohmanandWilliamRehg,eds.(1997),
DeliberativeDemocracy
Cambridge,MA:MITPress,JonElster,ed.(1998),
DeliberativeDemoc-
,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,andJamesFishkinand
Chapter2
9.Inothercases,wherethetopicofdeliberationconcernspolicytoward
agivenminoritygroup,theissuecanbeavoidedifthegroupismore
numerous.ThiswasthecaseintheDeliberativePollweconductedonthe
conditionoftheRomainBulgaria.TheRomawere10%ofthesample.In
apopulationapproaching8million,theRomaareestimatedtocomprise
upto800,000althoughself-identi“cationincensusquestionsleadsto
lowernumbers.See
Brie“ngMaterial:NationalDeliberativePoll:Policies
TowardtheRomainBulgaria
,p.5.Availableat
10.AphraseHabermasappliedtotheidealspeechsituationandtohis
conceptionofdeliberation.ItisessentiallythesameasthephraseJ.S.
MillappliedtotheCongressofOpinions.ForHabermassee,forexample,
JurgenHabermas(1999),IntroductionŽin
RatioJuris
,12/4,pp.329…
35,especiallyp.332andHabermas(1996),
ofliberalprocessequalitiesŽseethediscussionofothertrilemmasin
theconcludingsectionofChapter6below.Foradditionaldiscussionof
thetrilemmaofdemocraticreform,seeAnthonyMcGann(2006),
LogicofDemocracy:ReconcilingEquality,DeliberationandMinorityProtection
Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.126…9.
18.SeepreviousdiscussionwhichsituatesDeliberationDaywithinarange
ofreformproposals.
19.SeeDeliberationDay,Chapter6.
20.SeeAckerman,
WethePeople
,vol.I(1991)fortheconceptandvol.II
(1998)forhistoricalevidence.
21.ForanoverviewseeAlexanderKeyssar(2000),
TheRighttoVote:The
ContestedHistoryofDemocracyintheUnitedStates
,NewYork:BasicBooks.
22.TheclassicdiscussionisMancurOlson(1965),
TheLogicofCollective
,Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.SeealsoRussellHardin
CollectiveAction
,Washington,DC:RFFPress.
23.Verba,Schlozman,andBrady,p.15.
24.SeeDavidGlass,PeverilSquire,andRaymondWol“nger(1984),Voter
Turnout:AnInternationalComparisonŽin
PublicOpinion
,December…
January,pp.49…55,foraclassicstatementofthisargument.In2008there
wereabout150millionregisteredvotersoutofaneligiblepopulationof
29.RaymondWol“ngerandStevenRosenstone(1980),
WhoVotes
?New
HavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress.
30.StudyCircleshasrecentlychangeditsnametoEverydayDemocracy.For
agoodoverviewoftherationalebehindtheNationalIssuesForumssee
DavidMathews(1994),
PoliticsforPeople:FindingaResponsiblePublicVoice
Urbana,IL:UniversityofIllinoisPress.
31.CassR.Sunstein(2007),
Republic.com2.0
understandingŽin
DemocracyandItsCritics
,NewHaven,CT:YaleUniver-
sityPress.
42.SeeJamesS.Fishkin(1979),
TyrannyandLegitimacy:ACritiqueofPolitical
,Baltimore,MD:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.
43.Whendecision-makersareinablindalleysituationsuchthatnomatter
whichoptiontheychoose,terribleconsequenceswillresultforatleast
somepeople,ithardlyseemsappropriatetousesuchaseveretermas
12.FormyownaccountoftheseissuesseeJamesS.Fishkin(1982),
Limitsof
,NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,whichapplies
issuesofobligationtolargenumbersofactors,includingvoters.
13.ThisreadinghasmuchincommonwiththevaluablebookbyJoseph
19.AfamousargumentalongtheselineswasofferedbyRobertPaulWolff
InDefenceofAnarchism
,NewYork:Harper&Row.
20.SeeStephenAnsolabehereandShantoIyengar(1995),
GoingNegative:
HowPoliticalAdvertisementsShrinkandPolarizetheElectorate
,NewYork:
FreePress.
21.ForanarrativewithcompellingcasesseeSpencerOverton(2006),
Democracy:theNewPoliticsofVoterSuppression
,NewYork:Norton.
22.ForasomewhatutopianproposalalongtheselinesseeJohnBurnheim
IsDemocracyPossible
?Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCalifornia
23.SeeCarolePateman(1970),
ParticipationandDemocraticTheory
,Cam-
bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,chapters4and5.Foranin”uential
modernexampleofworkerdemocracy,seeJaquesKaswanandRuth
Kaswan(1989),TheMondragonCooperatives…inSpainŽin
WholeEarth
,Spring.Availableat
.Someotherimportantstatementsofparticipatory
democracyincludeBenjaminR.Barber(1984),
StrongDemocracy:Par-
ticipatoryPoliticsforaNewAge
,Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCalifornia
Press,andLoicBlondiaux(2008),
LeNouvelEspritdelaDemocratie
,Paris:
EditionsduSeuil.
24.SeeBruceAckermanandJamesS.Fishkin,
DeliberationDay
,NewHaven:
YaleUniversityPress,foroneefforttodevisesuchastrategy„combining
participationanddeliberationinmanydecentralizedsitesfordiscussion
onahumanscalebeforenationalelections.
25.FortheeffectivenessofvoterhandbooksseeDavidMagleby(1984),
DirectLegislation:VotingonBallotPropositions
,Baltimore,MD:Johns
HopkinsUniversityPress,pp.137…9.Forexperimentswiththe
effectivenessofhightechnologyvoterhandbooksseeShantoIyengar
andSimonJackman,CanInformationTechnologyEnergizeVoters?
ExperimentalEvidencefromthe2000and2002Campaigns.ŽAvailableat
http://pcl.stanford.edu/common/docs/research/iyengar/2003/energize.
.IyengarandJackmanlookateffectsofCD-basedhandbookson
voterinterestandturnout.
26.Thenear-circusatmosphereoftheCaliforniagubernatorialrecallelection
intheAmericanStates
,AnnArbor,MI:UniversityofMichigan
28.SeeFrankBryan(2003),
34.SeeHenryE.Brady,JamesS.Fishkin,andRobertC.Luskin(2003),
InformedpublicopinionaboutforeignpolicyŽin
TheBrookings
,21/3(Summer);ABI/INFORMGlobalp.16.Availableat
cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/2003/informed.pdf
.AlsoRobertC.
Luskin,JamesFishkin,andShantoIyengar,(2006),ConsideredOpinions
onU.S.ForeignPolicy:EvidencefromOnlineandFace-to-FaceDelib-
erativePolling.ŽAvailableat
http://cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/
2006/foreign-policy.pdf
35.IrisMarionYoung(2002),
InclusionandDemocracy
,Oxford:OxfordUni-
versityPress,andLynnM.Sanders(1997),AgainstDeliberation,Žin
PoliticalTheory
,25/3,pp.347…76.
36.Bycontrast,notethatontheviewofferedherethereisnoprivileged
positionforconsensus.
37.Posner,
LawPragmatismandDemocracy
,andShapiro,
MoralFoundations
forspiriteddefensesofthisposition.Butitisnotonlyaggregative/
39.See,forexample,JoshuaCohen(1997),ProcedureandSubstancein
DeliberativeDemocracy,ŽinJamesBohmanandWilliamRehg,eds.,
DeliberativeDemocracy:EssaysonReasonandPolitics
,Cambridge,MA:MIT
Press,andAmyGutmannandDennisThompson(1996),
Democracyand
Disagreement
,Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.
40.SeeDouglasW.Rae,TheLimitsofConsensualDecisionŽforanelegant
expositionoftheseissues.
41.SeenotetoCohen,andGutmannandThompsonabove.
42.CriteriaforqualityindeliberationarediscussedinthesectionDeliber-
ationŽinChapter2andalsoinBruceAckermanandJamesS.Fishkin
DeliberationDay
,NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,
pp.180…4.
43.Intheory,thisobjectionappliestobothCategoriesIIIandIVbecause
bothemployrawpreferenceswithoutanyrequirementsforhowprefer-
encesareformed.However,itisespeciallyaptforCategoryIVbecause
thatapproachdependsonthelegitimacyofconsensusandbrainwashing
wouldprovideaplausiblebasisforunderminingthatclaim.
44.SeeChapter3andtheAppendixfordiscussionsoftherangeofalternative
45.ThischartwasalsopresentedinDeliberationDaywhereitwasusedto
makeadifferentargument.
49.Posnerhaschargeddeliberativedemocracywithelitism,inenshrining
theviewsofaselectfewasthevoiceofthepeople.Itisworthconsidering
Robbins,ed.,
ThePhantomPublicSphere
,Minneapolis,MN:Universityof
MinnesotaPress,pp.1…32,especiallypp.10…11.
7.SeeJohnBrehmforthethreatofnonresponsetothevalidityofsurveys.
Theproblemhasonlygottenworsesincehewrote,giventhespreadof
cellphones,thedisappearanceoflandlines,andthetumblingofresponse
rates.JohnBrehm(1993),
ThePhantomRespondents:OpinionSurveysand
PoliticalRepresentation
,AnnArbor,MI:UniversityofMichiganPress.
8.IrisMarionYoung,
InclusionandDemocracy
,pp.52…7.
9.See,forexample,CassR.Sunstein(2003),TheLawofGroupPolar-
halfyearsyoungerthannon-participants.Theyalso,notcoincidentally,
averageroughlytwothirdsofapointhigheronaneightpointeducation
scale.Moretypically,thedifferencesareontheorderofthefollowing
32.See,forexample,JamesS.Fishkin(1997),
TheVoiceofthePeople:Pub-
licOpinionandDemocracy
,NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversity
Press,2ndedition,appendixE,p.221.SeealsoRobertC.Luskinand
JamesS.Fishkin(2005),DeliberativePolling,PublicOpinion,and
Democracy:TheCaseoftheNationalIssuesConvention.ŽAvailableat
http://cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/2005/issues-convention.pdf
33.SeeShantoIyengar,RobertC.Luskin,andJamesS.Fishkin(2004),
DeliberativePreferencesinthePresidentialNominationCampaign:
EvidencefromanOnlineDeliberativePoll.ŽPaperpresentedatthe
79.SeeNPPDBoardApprovesStatesLargestWindFarm.ŽAvailable
http://www.nppd.com/Newsroom/NewsRelease.asp?NewsReleaseID
80.NovaScotiaPowerCustomerEnergyForum:SummaryofResultsNovem-
ber19…20,2004.Availableat
2004/ns-results-summary.pdf
81.Seethecompanyreportat
http://www.canelect.ca/en/pdf_Review_05/
82.SeeReportontheDeliberativePollonVermontsEnergyFuture,ŽCenter
forDeliberativeOpinionResearchUniversityofTexasatAustin.Report
preparedbyRobertC.Luskin,DavidB.Crow,JamesS.Fishkin,Will
Guild,andDennisThomas.Availableat
83.See
http://publicservice.vermont.gov/planning/CEP%20%20WEB%20
84.ThesameprocesswasrepeatedinFebruary2009,withsimilarreceptive-
nessbytheLPC,andacommitmentbythetownandtheLPCtocontinue
thepatternonanannualbasis.
85.See
http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?article=468&toppic=kategori12
&language=uk
Chapter6
1.ItakethetermnormalpoliticsŽfromAckermans
WethePeople
,vol.1,
4.ThebeforeandafterŽresultsreportedinwhatfollowsareoftherandom
sampleandnottheadditionaloversampleofindigenousAustralians.
5.Seepage7oftheprojectsbrie“ngdocument.Despitetheestimates
ofmorethan700,000,only300,000identi“edthemselvesasRoma
intheCensus.See
6.SeeExecutiveSummary:NationalDeliberativePoll„PoliciesToward
theRomainBulgaria.Availableat
7.Theparticipantswere76%female.Maleandfemalerespondents
changedinthesamewayonthirty-sevenoutofthirty-nineofthe
policyissuesinthestudy.SeeNorthernIrelandsFirstDelibera-
tivePollShowsViewsofInformedParents.ŽAvailableat
8.SeeJamesS.Fishkin,RobertC.Luskin,IanOFlynn,andDavidRussell,
DeliberatingAcrossDeepDivides.ŽWorkingPaper,CenterforDelibera-
tiveDemocracy.Availableat
.Seeappendix.
9.See
theBBCprogram.
10.Forargumentsbothforandagainsttheapplicationofconsociational
17.Papandreou,PickingCandidatesbytheNumbers.Ž
18.Keydifferences,ofcourse,werethelimitednumberofcitizensinthetotal
populationandthefactthatcitizenshadtoputtheirnamesonalisttobe
partofthelotteryforparticipation.SeeHansen,
TheAthenianDemocracy
p.181.
19.SeeHermannSchmitt(2005),TheEuropeanParliamentElectionsofJune
2004:StillSecondOrder?Žin
WestEuropeanPolitics
,28/3,pp.650…79.The
SecondOrderElectionsŽthesiscontinuestoapplytotheoldmember
statesbutlesstothenewones.
DeliberativePoll.ŽWorkingPaperCenterforDeliberativeDemocracy,
Pagenumbersin
indicatetheentryisintheappendix.
ABCNews22
Abramoff,Jack22
accountability83,106,157,203n.23,
Ackerman,Bruce29,30,206n.59,
206n.60,208n.17,209n.20,213n.24,
215n.42,215n.48,225n.1
activism/activists50,51,117…18,128
Adams,John17
aggregativetheories85…8,93
Alexander,Lamar147
Alexandris,Panos9,10
AmericaSpeaks
group112,113
Andersen,VibekeNormann220n.31,
222n.47
Anti-Federalists15,17…18,20,24,25,176
collectiveconsistencychanges103…4,143…6
collectiveinformedconsent34…5,83,90,
seealso
DeliberativeDemocracy
collectivewillformation,
publicwill
communication161,169…70,178,183,
Democracy;EliteDeliberation;
ParticipatoryDemocracy;Deliberative
Denmark20,57,96,124,127,138…9,149,
157,178,213n.27,220n.31,227n.21
incentives12,26,33,52,54,59,74
DeliberationDay49,54,57
deliberativemicrocosms80…1,83
DeliberativePolls114,115,116
penalties82
rationalignorance91,98
selective7,49,202n.17
inclusion2,32…3,95,96…9,110,159,
216n.3
inequality40…1,100,101,106,110,129,
131,159,177,192…3
information34,35,42,84,99,102…3,108,
110,122,126,127,148,159
balanced115
civiccapacities,changesin139…41
criteria160
EU187…8,227n.21
voters135…7,173…4,190,
seealso
materials;citizens;experts;
informedconsent,
collectiveinformed
initiatives14,78,79
institutionaldesign8,15,39,40,47,51,
94…6,98,99,141,156,160…1
interestgroups8,51
DeliberativeDemocracyand104
DeliberativePolls114,124,151,153
partnerships146…50,170
publicaffairsbroadcasting173…4
microcosmicdeliberation,
Microsoft22
Mill,J.S.3,60,103,
,207n.1,223n.55
benevolentdictators42
CongressofOpinions55,73,92,119,
pluralvoting87
schoolsofpublicspirit78,79,141…2
mirrortheoryofrepresentation15,17,18,
20,23…6
misinformation4,5,6,42,125,126,179,
moderators53,132,160
Monceau,Henri227n.26
motivation1,2,7,12,17,18,21,25,26,
29,40,49,72,82,112,113,115
multinational/multistatedeliberations160,
161,175…89
mutualtrust/respect115,128,161,166,168
Mutz,DianaC.201n.7,209n.28
NationalCentreforSocialResearch137,
222n.44
NationalIssuesConvention114,118,125,
140,143,148,149…50,169,219n.20
NationalIssuesForums143
nation-states177,178,180…2,183,189
Nazis63
Nebraska153,154,155,220n.26
primaries51,67,77,79,87,91,92,148,
171…3,190
priming4,6,126
probabilitysampling23,24…5
Protestants,NorthernIreland166…9
Siu,Alice127,130Œ203n.18,204n.28,
217n.2,218n.3,221n.34,221n.37,
223n.55,223n.60
SLOPs(self-selectedlisteneropinion
poll)21…3,24,28,171
Smith,Melancton17
socialcomparisoneffect132…3
socialinequality40…1,100,101
voters/voting(
turnout9,28,51,77,209n.24,
seealso
votingpowerequality43…6,47
WashingtonPost
Westphaliansystem180,
seealso
Wilson,SirRonald225n.3
Wolff,RobertPaul213n.19
Wol“nger,RaymondandRosenstone,
Steven52
Wyoming33,47
Xekalaki,Evdokia203n.25,204n.28
Young,IrisMarion100,129,214n.35,
214n.37,217n.8
ZhaohuaJiang109

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